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UCLA LAW REVIEW

Deprivative Recognition
Erez Aloni
Abstract
Family law is now replete with proposals advocating for the legal recognition of
nonmarital relationships: those between friends, relatives, unmarried intimate partners,
and the like. The presumption underlying these proposals is that legal recognition is
financially beneficial to partners. This assumption is sometimes wrong: Legal recognition
of relationships can be harmful to unmarried partners—a reality whose impact on policy
concerning regulation of nonmarital unions has not been explored. As this Article
shows, a significant number of people benefit financially from nonrecognition of their
relationships. While in most cases the state turns a blind eye to this financial gain, when
it comes to a particular set of benefits, the state routinely recognizes partners against
their will in order to withhold or terminate benefits, a subset of ascriptive recognition
that I call “deprivative recognition.”
Deprivative recognition is unjust because it is asymmetrical: It deprives couples of benefits
they would receive if they were unpartnered while they nevertheless remain ineligible
to receive benefits granted to married couples in similar arenas. This asymmetry is
particularly troublesome because those who enjoy the benefits of nonrecognition often
belong to particularly vulnerable populations, such as those who qualify for meanstested programs. This Article recognizes and provides a normative assessment of
deprivative recognition and the distributive injustices it creates.
Identifying deprivative recognition, in turn, unearths a larger set of theoretical questions
about the interplay between cultural recognition and distributive justice in the law of
unmarried partners, including a question about what kind of law promotes both cultural
recognition and distributive justice for unmarried partners. The Article builds on
Nancy Fraser’s theory of recognition and redistribution as a “folk paradigm of justice,”
explaining why it is essential for the law of unmarried partners to adopt both of these
aspects of justice and how this can be done.
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INTRODUCTION
Following extensive efforts by lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) organizations,1 the Department of Education recently announced
that eligibility for financial aid for children who live with unmarried or same-sex
parents will be determined based on both parents’ incomes.2 Before this new rule,
children of unmarried or same-sex parents could include only one parent on
their financial aid application, a matter that caused some of these children to
feel as though their parents’ unions were second class.3 Even Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority in United States v. Windsor,4 referred to the old financial aid rule as a case in which same-sex couples would be “honored” to take
on obligations toward each other if given the opportunity.5 The media,
LGBT organizations, and those who support the recognition of complex family
forms have seen this policy change as a political victory.6
But, on second thought, this form of legal recognition will result in reduction
or elimination of financial aid for the majority of applicants who have unmarried or
same-sex parents.7 Moreover, legally recognizing these parents as partners
primarily to increase their participation in paying for their children’s educa1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

See, e.g., Rebecca Klein, FAFSA Changes to Recognize Same-Sex Parents by 2014,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/30/fafsa-changessame-sex-parents-2014_n_3185755.html (“‘GLSEN has long worked to ensure that sexual
orientation and gender identity are not used to discriminate against students in our nation’s
K-12 schools, whether that student identifies as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender
(LGBT), has LGBT friends, or comes from an LGBT family,’ said GLSEN Director of
Public Policy Shawn Gaylord, per the Blade.”).
Id.
See infra Part I.A.2.
United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013) (holding section 3 of the Defense
of Marriage Act unconstitutional).
Id. (“DOMA divests married same-sex couples of the duties and responsibilities that are an
essential part of married life and that they in most cases would be honored to accept were
DOMA not in force. For instance, because it is expected that spouses will support each other
as they pursue educational opportunities, federal law takes into consideration a spouse’s
income in calculating a student’s federal financial aid eligibility. Same-sex married couples
are exempt from this requirement.” (citation omitted)). In fact, by the time Windsor was
handed down, the financial aid policy had already changed—a matter that went unmentioned
by Justice Kennedy. Klein, supra note 1 (reporting on the change of calculating financial on
April 30, 2013, almost two months before the Windsor decision was issued).
Klein, supra note 1.
See Troy Onink, Department Of Education “Comes Out” on College Aid for Children of Gay Parents,
FORBES (May 6, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/troyonink/2013/05/06/department-ofeducation-comes-out-on-college-aid-for-students-of-gay-parents (“[S]tudents with parents
who are not married will now have to report both parent’s [sic] incomes, decreasing their aid
eligibility substantially.”).
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tion is an economic injustice. This is so because although their parenthood is
legally recognized, their relationship is not. Lacking such recognition, these
couples are excluded from hundreds of tangible economic benefits that are
granted only to married couples.8 As noted by Justice Kennedy in Windsor,
the financial loss that unmarried parent couples thus suffer from
nonrecognition of their relationship has a direct financial effect on their
parenthood.9 Furthermore, this new rule applies only to parents who live together;
thus, in reality, it does not affect parents per se, but only cohabitating parents.
The bottom line is that recognizing couples only for purposes of withholding
a benefit from them while denying other related benefits and protections
leads to economic maldistribution.10
The new federal rule highlights one of the foundational misconceptions
in legal scholarship surrounding domestic relationships: the dominant assumption
that legal recognition of relationships is always economically beneficial to the
recognized partners.11 More importantly, the rule illustrates the complicated
and undertheorized interplay between distributive justice and cultural recognition in the law governing unmarried partners:12 Cultural recognition can

8.

9.

10.
11.

12.

See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 956–57 (Mass. 2003) (“[T]he
fact remains that marital children reap a measure of family stability and economic security
based on their parents’ legally privileged status that is largely inaccessible, or not as readily
accessible, to nonmarital children. Some of these benefits are social . . . . Others are material,
such as the greater ease of access to family-based State and Federal benefits that attend the
presumptions of one’s parentage.”).
United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013) (“DOMA also brings financial
harm to children of same-sex couples. It raises the cost of health care for families by taxing
health benefits provided by employers to their workers’ same-sex spouses. And it denies or
reduces benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and parent, benefits that are an
integral part of family security.” (citations omitted)).
For an extended critique of the new financial aid rule, see Erez Aloni, Relationship Recognition
Madness, HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erez-aloni/relation
ship-recognition-madness_b_3422346.html?utm_hp_ref=college&ir=College#es_share_ended.
See, e.g., M. V. Lee Badgett, Variations on an Equitable Theme: Explaining International SameSex Partner Recognition Laws, in SAME-SEX COUPLES, SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS &
HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGES: A FOCUS ON CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS 95, 99
(Marie Digoix & Patrick Festy eds., 2004) (“Individual same-sex couples, especially those
with property or children, would have the same economic incentives as different-sex couples
to desire access to the legal framework created by marriage, in addition to any other
customary benefits of being married.”).
It is important to note that the term “recognition” can have two meanings that sometimes
intersect. “Legal recognition” is the action of the state, based on the type of relationship
targeted, that has legal consequences for partners. “Cultural recognition,” discussed further
in Parts II and IV, is the acknowledgment of the differences of individuals or collective
groups, without the demand that they assimilate to the dominant culture.
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result in economic maldistribution, and as this Article subsequently explains,
redistributive economic remedies can result in cultural misrecognition.13
Indeed, the fundamental goals of the marriage equality movement have been
to eliminate economic maldistribution and to foster cultural recognition of nontraditional families.14 In recent decades, family law has also centered around such
struggles by following a similar logic; it is now replete with suggestions that the
state should recognize a variety of nonmarital relationships—friends, relatives, unmarried conjugal couples, and nonmonogamous groupings15—as worthy
of protection.
Largely missing from the celebration of recognition in the law of domestic relations is the simple yet meaningful fact that legal recognition comes
with a financial cost—sometimes an unjust cost.16 It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of understanding this phenomenon in the project of
theorizing the law of unmarried people. To put it simply, attempting to address
the law of unmarried partners without taking account of this issue is unsound.
This is because there is a clear correlation between the demographic characteristics of unmarried partners in the United States and the groups that gain
fiscally from legal nonrecognition. That is, the largest groups of cohabitants
include poor and low-income individuals who are the beneficiaries of means-

13.

14.

15.
16.

Cultural recognition was one of the two main rationales behind the department’s new rule.
LGBT organizations fought for this policy in order to repair a cultural misrecognition that
the previous policy resulted in. But for the Department of Education there were two
rationales: one, reducing the cultural harm in misrecognizing unmarried parents; and two,
better reflecting the financial situation of applicants and saving taxpayers money. See Libby
A. Nelson, Aid Applicants With 2 Mothers, INSIDEHIGHERED (Apr. 30, 2013),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/04/30/fafsa-changes-recognized-many-kindsparents.
Cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Why Marriage?, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS 224, 228–
33 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012) (explaining that marriage equality is
being pursued for access to marriage’s tangible goods and status equality). One may argue
that cultural recognition has been the main mission of the marriage equality movement and
maldistribution has been the form of tangible injury that recognition proponents have
asserted. Indeed this is evident from the strong resistance to civil unions, which solve almost
all the financial problems that stem from the same-sex marriage ban but do not have the
cultural weight that is attendant with marriage.
See infra Part II.B (surveying the major proposals for legal recognition of nonmarital
relationships).
As I discuss in Part II.B, the assumption that some people are not interested in recognition of
their relationships is sometimes discussed in family law scholarship. See, e.g., Shahar Lifshitz,
Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1565, 1569 (2009). But there the assumption is that people are not interested
in recognition because they are unready for or uninterested in commitment to each other—
not because the state would recognize their union in order to withhold or terminate an
existing benefit. See id. at 1576.
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tested programs,17 the elderly and divorced who may lose existing entitlements
upon remarriage,18 and college students who can be awarded more financial
aid for higher education based on their (or their parents’) nonmarital status.19
This Article undertakes to provide an account of the areas in which
nonrecognition can be financially rewarding. It then examines how the notion of
gaining from nonrecognition has been overlooked by most legal scholarship in the
area, and assesses how policies promoting legal recognition, if accepted,
would affect the lives of those people currently in unrecognized relationships.20
More puzzling than the dominant assumption that legal recognition is
virtually always financially beneficial to the couple is the prevalence of the belief
that legal recognition is always at least partially voluntary. Proposals for legal
recognition of nonmarital unions assume that only what this Article terms
partially ascriptive recognition ever occurs—that is, they presume that the state
ascribes obligations on couples only following the request of one of the partners. For example, upon the end of a nonmarital relationship, an ex-partner
files a claim for equal distribution of the couple’s mutual property. The state
then places marital-like obligations on the couple and mandates the distribution of property. In reality, however, purely ascriptive recognition—cases in
which the state recognizes such couples without the request of either partner—
already occurs in some circumstances.21 So far, legal scholarship has addressed
only partially ascriptive recognition (which is generally referred to as simply
ascriptive recognition), but has not recognized the subcategory of purely
ascriptive recognition and its consequences.
This Article focuses in particular on one form of purely ascriptive recognition, which I term deprivative22 recognition: when neither partner will benefit from recognition and yet the state still recognizes the relationship, a
recognition that results in deprivation. In cases of deprivative recognition,
the state or other third party (such as an ex-spouse) requests that the relationship be legally recognized ad-hoc, such that a benefit stemming from the
17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.A.2.
As I discuss in Part I, gaining from nonrecognition could mean simply maintaining the status
quo, such as not getting married, or could mean changing status from married to divorced, to
being unrecognized by the law. What I do not discuss are the cases in which people get
married only in order to gain benefits that are attached to marriage. For a discussion of such
cases, see Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2012).
See infra Part III (discussing the differences between partially and purely ascriptive recognition).
Deprivative (adjective):
tending to deprive, causing deprivation, relating to deprivation.
COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Gerry Breslin Ed., 2011).
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nonrecognition may be withheld or terminated.23 For example, the cohabitationtermination rule, which has been adopted in most states, provides that upon
cohabitation with a new partner, an alimony recipient loses her alimony.24
Deprivative recognition and the financial advantages of nonrecognition
lie at the crossroads of family law and poverty law. The way that public policy—
especially as reflected in the U.S. welfare system—affects people’s marital
choices has been the subject of much debate.25 But the effects of deprivative
recognition and the gain from nonrecognition within the broader law and
policy regarding unmarried partnerships remain virtually unexplored.26
This Article thus juxtaposes cases in which the state identifies and terminates
benefits that stem from nonrecognition (for example, termination of alimony
upon the recipient’s cohabitation) with cases in which the state turns a blind
eye to the financial advantages of nonrecognition (such as with Supplemental
Security Income, income tax, and survivor’s benefits). By comparing the benefits
that are terminated upon cohabitation with the benefits that remain, this
Article theorizes deprivative recognition as a selective regulatory mechanism.
I argue that deprivative recognition targets what social conservatives see as
immoral behaviors like cohabitation after divorce and reliance on welfare,

23.

24.
25.

26.

Thus, it is not only the partner’s plea to the state that differentiates partially ascriptive and
deprivative recognition. Rather, partially ascriptive recognition aims to redress an economic
injustice that stems from the misrecognition of the relationships, while, as this Article shows,
deprivative recognition results in the privation of essential financial resources. See infra Part
III (defining deprivative recognition). As I discuss in Parts III and IV, it is possible that
some other sort of purely ascriptive recognition will not be deprivative.
See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the cohabitation-termination doctrine).
See, e.g., Leslie A. Whittington & James Alm, The Effects of Public Policy on Marital Status in
the United States, in MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY 75, 76 (Shoshana A. GrossbardShechtman, ed., 2003) (“The U.S. welfare system has probably generated more controversy
about how public policy affects human behavior than any other program.”).
As has been recognized for almost a decade, the two fields of family law and poverty law
generally operate separately. Part of this Article’s contribution is in joining the scholarship
that aims to integrate them. See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 825, 832 (2004) (“The exclusion of welfare law from the family law canon has allowed
legal authorities to avoid explaining why the law applies very different rules to govern familial
rights and responsibilities in poor families.”); see also Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of
Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 229 (2000) (“Family law and welfare law share a
connectedness that has not been extensively addressed by scholars in either the family law or
welfare law arenas.”); Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family
Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP.
L. 753, 764 (2010) (Family law, as reflected in modern family law codes, courses, bar exams,
and casebooks, “begins to look like a collection of the legal issues about the formation and
dissolution of formal family relationships; the legal issues affecting the ongoing life of family
relationships are almost all housed in other courses! This exclusion is stunning, when you
think about it.”).
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while validating other kinds of assistance that they deem socially acceptable.27
Further, this Article suggests that the more deprivative recognition expands,
the more it will burden and impede the creation of new kinship networks because
of concerns about the financial loss that may result, or about the intrusive and
bureaucratic nature of deprivative recognition.28
I contend that deprivative recognition is an asymmetrical apparatus.
Couples are recognized only for the purpose of terminating a benefit; they are
not recognized when it is a matter of gaining most of the partnership rights
that would otherwise stem from these same relationships. (Often, the law
does not even ascribe legally binding financial obligations between the nowrecognized partners upon their separation). In this way, deprivative recognition
often leads to economic maldistribution: The deprivatively recognized couples
may not support each other financially, nor are they obliged to do so—even
when recognition results in cutting off an individual from a vital source of income
(such as alimony or welfare).29
If, as this Article puts forward, legal recognition is not always tantamount to
cultural and economic justice, and cultural recognition can result in economic
injustice, what kind of law would be able to protect the needs of unmarried
partners without causing misrecognition or maldistribution? Indeed, deprivative
recognition reflects a very great dilemma in family law and thus invites exploration of a larger strategic problem: On the one hand, pursuing redistributive justice
independently from cultural recognition, and vice versa, would result in a lack of
justice for unmarried couples. Yet on the other hand, simultaneously pursuing
redistribution and cultural recognition can result in one undercutting the other.30
Legal scholars have overlooked the tension inherent in simultaneously
pursuing both distributive justice and cultural recognition in family law. But
the interplay of the two has stood in the center of discussions in political science
and moral philosophy for almost twenty years.31 The history is instructive. In
the 1960s, cultural recognition of differences became the primary political
demand in the United States and other Western developed democracies and
has remained such. Subsequently, in the 1990s, a few influential theoreticians

27.

28.
29.
30.
31.

Cf. Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 182
(2003) (“[T]ransfer payments to assist needy children and their caregivers are considered
pathological (‘welfare as we know it’), while transfer payments for widowed and disabled
persons stay respectable, a kind of insurance.” (footnote omitted)).
See infra Part III.A.3.
See id.
For examples of how redistributional and recognitional remedies can undercut each other in
the regulation of unmarried partnerships, see infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.A.
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contended that cultural recognition is the most important aspiration for political movements to pursue. But in 1995, the prominent critical scholar Nancy
Fraser challenged the adequacy of recognition as the preeminent social-justice
claim.32 While Fraser accepted the importance of recognition, she proposed a
model of redistribution and recognition as “folk paradigms of justice.”33 In order
to pursue the two aspects of justice concurrently, she distinguished between
transformative remedies, which aim to correct social injustice at the root, and
affirmative remedies, focused only on correcting specific problems.34 She asserted
that nothing short of adopting transformative recognition and redistribution
remedies (rather than affirmative remedies) would “meet the requirements of
justice for all” while avoiding the ostensible dichotomy and contradiction between
the two.35
Fraser’s insight provides a critical addition to the law of unmarried couples.
Building on her work, I argue that while redistribution and recognition have,
de facto, long been at the center of family law, major proposals in the field fail
to encompass both components. I submit that the law of unmarried partners
ought to be based on a perspective that acknowledges the important of both
cultural recognition and redistribution—in pursuing a just policy to accommodate
unmarried partners, both aims are crucial, and a policy that is based on these
foundations will avoid retrograde policies like deprivative recognition.
Extrapolating from Fraser’s framework, I catalogue major proposals and
theories concerning recognition of nonmarital unions that arise in family law
scholarship. I sort these approaches according to their remedies and evaluate
which theories fail to achieve, and which succeed in achieving, the dual perspectives of cultural recognition and equitable economic redistribution. While
this theoretical examination reveals significant tensions between legal policies
that aim mainly to remedy cultural misrecognition and those invested mainly
in redistribution, I offer an analysis, in general terms, of which proposals
and policies could be reconciled and how this could be done.
This Article is organized into four Parts. Part I explores the possible financial
benefits of nonrecognition. Part II lays out the argument that the rise in the

32.
33.

34.
35.

See Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’
Age, 212 NEW LEFT REV. 68, 70–74 (1995).
NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A
POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 11 (Joel Golb et al. trans., 2003) (“[I]n their
political reference . . . the terms ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’ refer not to philosophical
paradigms but rather to folk paradigms of justice, which inform present-day struggles in civil
society.”).
Fraser, supra note 32, at 82–86.
Id. at 93.

Deprivative Recognition

1285

number of complex family structures, has resulted in dignitary harm and
economic injustice to people in nonmarital unions, contra marriage
exceptionalism in the United States. The Article then critiques the main theories
and proposals for the treatment of nonmarital unions—which are referred to
collectively as the trend toward recognition—for failing to take into account
their impact on those who currently gain financially from being unrecognized. Part III presents the unacknowledged policy of deprivative recognition
as a selective regulatory mechanism, and offers four critiques of that policy.
Part IV explores social justice recognition claims more broadly, proposing a
shift toward a theory of recognition and redistribution in the law governing
unmarried partners.
I.

THE POTENTIAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF NONRECOGNITION

Joe Entwisle and his girlfriend have been together for a decade but do
not get married because, if they do, Joe, who is paralyzed from the shoulders
down, will lose his Medicaid benefits, which are essential to his daily life.36
Hillary St. Pierre had health insurance but, like others, when she developed
cancer she contemplated “Medicaid divorce” in order to get better coverage
and avoid bankrupting the entire family.37 Angela and David Boyter got divorced
to avoid the tax “marriage penalty.”38 And US News & World Report advises
students and their families that “[t]here may be a big financial aid reward if
you choose a delay [in marriage] or simply cohabitation.”39 These are only a
few examples of how people can benefit economically from their nonmarital
status.
Who comprises the major groups that gain financially from
nonrecognition, by what methods do they gain, and how pervasive is this
phenomenon? These are difficult questions, and this Article cannot and does

36.
37.

38.
39.

Stacy Forster, Disability Rule Change Sought: Marrying Can Lead to Loss of Vital Medicaid
Coverage, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 2, 2008, at 1B.
Hillary St. Pierre, I Considered A “Medicaid Divorce” When Cancer Began Bankrupting Me,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hillary-st-pierre/iconsidered-a-medicaid-d_b_816668.html; see also Michael L. Olver & Christopher C. Lee,
Medicaid Divorce: An Overview, HELSELL FETTERMAN (Dec. 2010), www.helsell.com/
helsell-news/medicaid-divorce-an-overview.
See Boyter v. Comm'r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1383–84 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that the sham
transaction doctrine could be applied to married taxpayers who divorce in order to avoid the
marriage penalty).
Kim Clark, How to Maximize Your Student's Chances for Need-Based Aid, US NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2008/04/10/how-tomaximize-your-students-chances-for-need-based-aid.
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not purport to provide exhaustive answers. Giving accurate statistics and
information about the pervasiveness of the occurrence is impossible because
the census (and other sources) does not examine how many of the nonmarital
households gain financially from their nonrecognition.40 Other difficulties in
providing quantitative and qualitative accounts of the phenomenon stem
from the ethics of gaining financially from nonrecognition. While for some,
gaining from nonrecognition could be a side effect of an independent life
choice (such as, having the relationship one wants), for others it could be a
strategic behavior to avoid the financial loss that derives from legal recognition.41
And it is not easy—sometimes it is even impossible—to distinguish between
those who are unmarried because of their fear of financial loss attached to
recognition and those who are unmarried for other reasons (and some may of
course be motivated by both financial loss and other reasons).
To clarify, I am not implying that the main motivation behind living in
unmarried relationships is to increase eligibility for means-tested programs or
to avoid losing entitlements. The effect of welfare policies on marriage and
cohabitation is a highly contested one.42 But even if the decision not to get
married is based solely on a desire to avoid financial loss, it does not necessarily raise
an ethical problem. Some partnerships are simply unrecognized by the state, and,

40.

41.

42.

Moreover, until recently it was difficult to identify the range of nonmarital relationships in
the United States. See Sheela Kennedy & Catherine A. Fitch, Measuring Cohabitation and
Family Structure in the United States: Assessing the Impact of New Data From the Current
Population Survey, 49 DEMOGRAPHY 1479, 1480 (2012) (explaining how, prior to 2007, the
Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey documented
only persons who reported themselves as “unmarried partners” of the householder, and how
the change since then allows the state to better identify different sorts of nonmarital unions);
see also Sven Drefahl, Do the Married Really Live Longer? The Role of Cohabitation and
Socioeconomic Status, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 462, 463 (2012) (“More and more individuals
are classified as never married, widowed, or divorced, even though they are living with a
partner.”).
Compare Kathryn Edin, Few Good Men: Why Poor Mothers Don’t Marry or Remarry, AM.
PROSPECT, Jan. 3, 2000, at 26, 31 (reporting that she has found “virtually no support for the
welfare disincentives argument, since very few mothers say that they have avoided marriage or
remarriage to maintain eligibility for welfare, even when asked directly”), with Maxine
Eichner, Beyond Private Ordering: Families and the Supportive Stat, 23 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 305, 306 (2010) (“Social Security survivors’ benefits influence some
recipients not to marry.”), and Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Could We? Should We?,
10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 279, 296 (2008) (“[P]olicies that distinguish cohabitation from
marriage invite evasion and contribute to the decline of formal marriage if those policies
attach significant financial benefits to nonmarriage.”).
See, e.g., Lisa A. Gennetian & Virginia Knox, Staying Single: The Effects of Welfare Reform
Policies on Marriage and Cohabitation 1–5 (Next Generation, Working Paper No. 13, 2003)
(surveying some of the disagreements about the connection between welfare programs and
motivation to marry); Whittington & Alm, supra note 25, at 76.

Deprivative Recognition

1287

for them, the concomitant financial gain is unavoidable. If the state does not
impose any mutual obligations on friends or same-sex couples, then there is
nothing unethical in accepting the financial gain that accrues from these statuses.43
Further, if opposite-sex couples who can get married feel that they are unready
to do so, or do not want the marital status for ideological reasons, then their gain
from nonrecognition is a side effect of their relationship. In fact, when partners
are asked about their relationship on official forms, most often the options are
“married,” “divorced,” or “single,” so they cannot declare a different status.44
And those who do not get married in order to be better off financially are no different from those who get married to gain marital benefits—a legitimate and
widely accepted practice.45 (I refer not to the practice of getting married “fictively”
solely to get marital benefits, but to the common practice of considering marital
benefits in the decision to get married.) Finally, the state itself creates domestic
partnerships registrations, open to elderly only, in order to allow these partners
to avoid the termination of post-marital benefits, but allowing them to enjoy
state protections that otherwise are reserved only to married couples. In other
words, in the case of elderly population (perhaps because the group holds
considerable political power) the state supports strategic behavior with regard to
benefits that stem from nonrecognition.
Before I proceed, one important caveat is in order. By documenting the
financial gains that stem from legal nonrecognition, this Article does not
deny the cultural significance that is attached to marriage, particularly in U.S.
society.46 Nor does the Article disregard the financial perks that attach to marriage.
Clearly, nonrecognition can come with many economic disadvantages—as has
43.

44.

45.

46.

See, e.g., Axel Berryhill, FAFSA to Include Options for Reporting Same-sex Parents Starting
2014, http://www.dailycal.org/2013/05/01/department-of-education-announces-that-fafsawill-include-options-to-report-same-sex-parents-starting-2014 (last updated May 2, 2013)
(telling the story of an unmarried lesbian couple’s daughter who “has no way to fully tell the
truth when applying for financial aid”).
Cf. NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, Civil Marriage v. Civil Unions (2012), available at http://www.
now.org/issues/marriage/marriage_unions.html (“Every day we fill out forms that ask us
whether we are married, single, divorced or widowed. People joined in a civil union do not fit
in any of those categories.”).
See Nancy F. Cott, No Objections, What History Tells Us About Remaking Marriage, BOS. REV.
(Jan. 1, 2011), http://bostonreview.net/nancy-f-cott-no-objections-history-of-marriage-same-sexgay (“Governments at all levels in the United States have long encouraged people to marry for
economic benefit to the public as well as to themselves.”); For Many Americans, “Marriage Is an
Economic Decision,” Sociologist Says, NPR (Sept. 29, 2010), www.npr.org/templates/transcript/
transcript.php?storyId=130218357 (interviewing Andrew J. Cherlin, who says that “marriage is an
economic decision”).
Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of
Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105, 141 n.213 (2010) (discussing the
value of marriage in American society compared to European countries).
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been emphasized in almost every article and court case on the subject.47 And
marriage has other invaluable benefits, such as parental presumptions and
decisionmaking privileges, the absence of which often requires people to go
through expensive and emotionally exhausting procedures.48 Instead, the
argument herein is that, in some cases, the financial benefits of nonrecognition
trump the other potential benefits of marriage. In addition, in a regime in
which people can get married and divorced fairly easily, a couple could gain
from nonrecognition and then change its status to enjoy the privileges of marriage;
later, they could divorce and enjoy the value of nonrecognition.49 This fluidity is available only to couples who can get married in the first place.50 Finally,
the benefits from nonrecognition are often time-limited; thus, in order to enjoy
these benefits, individuals typically must not remain unmarried forever but rather just delay marriage. For example, welfare grants provided by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) are limited to five years, and educational
financial aid is limited to the time one pursues academic studies.51
Below, I divide the potential gain from nonrecognition into three central
categories. First, nonmarital status matters in relation to programs for which
applicant’s eligibility and benefit level is means-tested (such as financial aid,
Medicaid, TANF, and Social Security Disability Insurance).52 Second,
nonmarital status matters vis-à-vis entitlements that commence upon the
ending of the previous marriage, and that are, in some cases, terminated upon
remarriage (such as alimony and survivors’ benefits). Third, marital status
matters in cases in which the state or third parties treat the unmarried partners as

47.
48.

49.
50.
51.
52.

See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006) (“It is undisputed that the
benefits of marriage are many.”).
For example, in the absence of marriage, a partner who wants to have medical
decisionmaking prerogatives needs either to have a power of attorney, or, in a minority of
states, to register with the state. See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND
GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 160–61 (2008). Without
parental presumption, the nonbiological parent must go through adoption procedures. See
Clare Huntington, Negative Family Law, in FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW
UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS ch.4 (forthcoming 2014).
See Abrams, supra note 20, at 46. (“The possibility of ‘divorce on demand’ created the
potential for the widespread instrumental use of marriage as a vehicle for opting into
particular benefits of marriage and then opting out before the burdens became oppressive.”).
Thus, for instance, if a college student couple benefits from their nonmarital status by
receiving more financial aid, they can get married upon graduation and enjoy the marriagetax bonus.
Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency,
13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 415, 469 (2005) (“TANF established a five-year
lifetime limit on welfare assistance and significantly toughened work requirements.”).
FREDERICK HERTZ, COUNSELING UNMARRIED COUPLES: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE
LEGAL REPRESENTATION 67, 195–96 (2011).
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separate economic units for the purpose of realizing potential liability (rather
than assistance, as in category one), while the married are treated as one economic
unit (such as income tax, bankruptcy,53 and joint liability for shared debts54). I
elaborate briefly on all broad categories but not on every possible benefit
within each category.55 I look more fully at the first category (means-tested
programs) because it is most relevant for the population that typically lives in
nonmarital unions in the United States. The second category, post-marital
entitlements, is markedly relevant to the lives of unmarried partners too, but I
explore it further in Part III.A.1 in the context of deprivative recognition.
The third category, involving tax, bankruptcy, and joint liability, represents
an important venue of fiscal gain, but it is less correlated with the profile of
U.S. cohabitants, so I present it only briefly.56
A.

Means-Tested Assistance

Generally, eligibility for means-tested assistance is calculated on the basis of
the means possessed by the applicant (income and assets).57 When the law
recognizes the applicants’ relationship, the state considers the partner’s wealth
as part of the overall family wealth in determining eligibility and benefit level.58
53.

54.
55.

56.

57.
58.

Filing for joint bankruptcy is limited to spouses. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). Often, filing
jointly is an advantage because it can save the costs and fees of filing two separate claims, and
because consolidation is financially beneficial. See A. Mechele Dickerson, To Love, Honor,
and (Oh!) Pay: Should Spouses Be Forced to Pay Each Other's Debts?, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 961, 975–
87 (1998). But being treated as married could be a disadvantage because the “means test”
includes income from nearly any source to the debtor or the debtor’s spouse. 11 U.S.C. §
101(10A) (2006).
HERTZ, supra note 52, at 93–100.
For a more comprehensive—but not exhaustive and not updated—list of possible financial
advantages for nonmarried couples, see Wendell E. Primus & Jennifer Beeson, Safety Net
Programs, Marriage, and Cohabitation, in JUST LIVING TOGETHER: IMPLICATIONS OF
COHABITATION ON FAMILIES, CHILDREN, AND SOCIAL POLICY 170, 176–81 (Alan
Booth & Ann C. Crouter eds., 2002).
To suffer the marriage penalty, a couple needs to be “dual earning, middle income.” This is
less typically the profile of cohabitants in the United States. In addition, the marriage penalty
could be balanced by other benefits provided by marriage that are more typical for those in
the upper middle class, such as the estate-tax exemption. But for elderly couples, one of the
main groups of cohabitants in the United States, joint liability as a result of marriage can be
very important. See John R. Schleppenbach, Strange Bedfellows: Why Older Straight Couples
Should Advocate for the Passage of the Illinois Civil Union Act, 17 ELDER L.J. 31, 40 (2009)
(“Older individuals who contemplate remarriage may also be justifiably concerned about
protecting their individual wealth and avoiding the liabilities of a potential spouse.”).
In the case of financial aid for college, it is sometimes the wealth of the parents that matters.
See infra Part I.A.2.
In other programs—like food stamps and Section 8 assistance—eligibility is calculated based
on household income, regardless of marital status. HERTZ, supra note 52, at 197–98. For
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Depending on the partner’s income level, not being recognized as a family
unit may or may not be advantageous. Usually, because eligibility is restricted
to the poorest, the addition of even the smallest income could render someone
unqualified. For example, under the 2013 federal guidelines, the poverty level
for one person is $11,490 per year, while for a household of two it is $15,510.
Thus, often, adding the wealth of another person increases the assets owned
together and eliminates eligibility.59 Other times, however, especially if the
nonapplicant partner is poorer, not including the partner’s income may result
in a loss because the total household income would not be divided by the actual
number of family members.
Eligibility for means-tested assistance is very relevant to many nonmarital
households in the United States—there is a correlation between the population
eligible for means-based assistance and the demographic of people in
nonmarital unions. Looking at shared income earned in the years 2006–2008,
close to 11 percent of households composed of nonmarital unions lived below
the poverty line.60 Since this calculation is based on the income of both partners—
which is not calculated in most means-tested programs—it thus reflects lower
numbers than the actual percentage of cohabiting couples who are likely to
rely on means-based programs.61 A different and more traditional calculation
in 2009 found that among cohabitants without college degrees, 31 percent
lived below the poverty line (compared with 9 percent of married adults without
college degrees).62 There is, thus, a solid correlation between living in
nonmarital households and eligibility for means-tested programs in the United
States.

59.

60.
61.
62.

this reason, I do not discuss these programs below. But even in these cases, being unmarried
can be helpful, as some women live with “a ‘shadowed’ cohabiting partner, who unofficially
occupies the home as a contributing member but whose presence is concealed from housing and
public assistance authorities.” Marya Leroy Dantzer, Place, Face, Space: How Housing Assistance
and Household Composition Shape Low-Income Mothers’ Access to Resources 158 (Apr.
2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern University) (on file with author),
available at http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20002467.
See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY
108 (2010); cf. Kennedy & Fitch, supra note 40, at 1485 (“Including cohabiting partner
incomes in family poverty measurements more completely accounts for the economic
resources available in cohabiting families and thus substantially reduces estimated poverty rates.”).
Kennedy & Fitch, supra note 40, at 1493.
John Iceland, Measuring Poverty With Different Units of Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF
MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN FAMILY RESEARCH 221, 222–23 (Sandra L. Hofferth & Lynn
M. Casper eds., 2007).
Richard Fry & D’Vera Cohn, Living Together: The Economics of Cohabitation, PEW SOCIAL &
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (June 27, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/06/27/livingtogether-the-economics-of-cohabitation/2/#i-prevalence-and-growth-of-cohabitation.
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The other prominent group of cohabitants that is linked to means-tested
assistance is students in higher education, who can use their relationship status (or
their parents’) to increase their eligibility—not only for financial aid from the
federal government, but for other support from the university and for external
grants. Below, I examine more thoroughly two of the programs that can benefit the unrecognized.
1. Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid
Title XVI of the Social Security Act establishes Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), a means-tested program that assists people over sixty-five years
old, or who are blind or disabled and do not have sufficient income and resources
to maintain a standard of living at the established federal minimum-income
level.63 In many states, if a person is eligible for SSI, she is automatically
qualified for Medicaid.64 Since Medicaid provides free access to a variety of
expensive medical treatments, often it is essential to preserve SSI eligibility in
order to ensure access to Medicaid.65
Being in unrecognized relationships can be substantially advantageous
for the purpose of eligibility for SSI.66 First, in the case of spouses who live
together, if one spouse is ineligible for SSI, the Social Security Administration
deems a portion of that spouse’s income or assets as part of the claimant’s income.67
Second, the amount that is granted to two eligible spouses is smaller than the
amount granted to two eligible individuals. Thus, in 2014, the monthly payment
that eligible married couples received from the federal government was $1082.68
If partners were unmarried and both were eligible for SSI, each individual received
$721 a month, a combined amount of $1442.69 In both cases, these are solid financial enticements for low-income people.
63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.

42 U.S.C. § 1381 (2006).
Understanding Supplemental Security Income (SSI): SSI and Eligibility for Other Government
and State Programs, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-other-ussi.htm
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Understanding Supplemental Security Income].
James R. Sheldon, Jr. & Diana M. Straube, Disability, Divorce, SSI, and Medicaid: Using
Creative Alimony, Child Support and Property Settlements to Maximize SSI, Ensure Medicaid
Eligibility, and Create Funding for Assistive Technology, (Nat’l Assistive Tech. Advoc. Project,
Neighborhood Legal Services Inc., Buffalo, N.Y.), Sept. 2008, available at http://www.nls.org/files/
Disability%20Law%20Hotlines/National%20AT%20Advocacy/DisabilityDivorce.pdf.
Robert E. Rains, Disability and Family Relationships: Marriage Penalties and Support
Anomalies, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 566–68 (2006) (explaining the marriage penalty for
married couples who receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI)).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1802(a)(1) (2008).
Understanding Supplemental Security Income, supra note 64.
Id.
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The state is not entirely blind, however, to the possibility that a
nonspouse is supporting the applicant. The Social Security Administration
defines income as “anything you receive in cash or in kind that you can use to
meet your needs for food and shelter.”70 Accordingly, if an applicant’s unmarried
partner is paying the rent, for example, the Administration may count part of
that payment in determining the applicant’s benefit eligibility.71 In addition,
to prevent “fraud,”72 the Code of Federal Regulations determines that the parties do
not have to be legally married to be considered spouses for the purposes of SSI eligibility—they only need to hold themselves out as a married couple.73 Accordingly, a claimant for SSI benefits who states on her application that she is
unmarried and is living in the same household with an unrelated, opposite-sex
person could be deemed married if the couple “lead[s] people to believe that
[they] are each other’s husband and wife.”74 But most nonrecognized partners
do not fall under the definition of “holding themselves out” as husband and
wife as interpreted by the Social Security Administration, and thereby still
enjoy the benefits of the unmarried status for purposes of SSI and Medicaid.75
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (2008).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1131 (2008).
Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the goal of the “deemed
married” provision is, inter alia, the prevention of fraud).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1816 (2008).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1826(c)(2) (2008).
For the Social Security Administration to determine whether the couple holds itself out as
husband and wife, the applicant needs to answer the following questions: what names the two
are known by; whether they introduce themselves as husband and wife, or, if not, how they
are introduced; what names are used on the mail for each of them; who owns or rents the
place where they live; and whether any deeds, leases, time payment papers, tax papers, or any
other papers show the couple as husband and wife. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1826(c)(1)(i)–(v) (2008).
The Social Security Administration is not bound by a state’s definition of “marriage” for this
purpose; and “deemed married” is not limited to a state’s definition of “common law
marriage” (which is recognized only in a minority of states). Barbara Samuels, Basic Social
Security Retirement and Basic SSI Eligibility Requirements, 143 PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE NEW YORK LAW 41 N1 (2004) (“‘Holding out’ is a concept unique to SSI. It
has no relationship to the concept of common law marriage.”). But the above-listed
questions, which are written into the regulation, are, indeed, similar to those required for
proof of valid common law marriage. See GÖRAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A
LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR COHABITATION 511–14 (2008). Notably, the definition of
“holding themselves out as a married couple” seems to present a high bar for proving such
behavior: to be deemed as holding themselves out as a married couple, the couple should use a
single last name, introduce themselves as husband and wife, and so on—practices that seem
less typical for most cohabitants today than in the past. See id. at 913–14. Indeed, one of the
reasons that common law marriage is hard to prove is that most people do not “present
themselves as husband and wife” today. See id. at 564–65.
No wonder, then, that the only reported court decision that upheld the Social Security
Administration’s decision to deem an unmarried couple as married includes a unique set of
facts in which the couple demonstrated that they held each other out as married: the wife
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Similarly, nonmarital households can gain significantly from
nonrecognition with respect to their eligibility for Medicaid. One example is
the way informal partners are financially privileged (compared to recognized
couples) when one of them requires nursing-home services. Since long-term
care is very expensive, Medicaid has become a common source to fund nursinghome care.76 According to the spousal impoverishment provisions of the
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988,77 “all of a couple’s resources are
considered in determining Medicaid eligibility regardless of whether the assets are
jointly or separately held.”78 The institutionalized spouse can qualify for
Medicaid if the couple “spends down” their assets on the hospitalization—for
example, if the couple spends their money until the appropriate asset limit is
reached.79 Theoretically, if the partners are unmarried and keep their finances
separate,80 the noninstitutionalized person can keep her personal assets yet
have Medicaid pay for the hospitalization of her partner.81
The valuable advantages for unmarried couples described above have induced
a noticeable number of couples to engage in “Medicaid divorce,” since the
medical costs of one spouse can force the couple to deplete its assets, leaving
the other spouse impoverished.82 While statistical studies about the size of
this phenomenon do not exist, the observable amount of anecdotal evidence—
from court cases, legal guides for lawyers on how to handle such divorces, and
newspaper articles—testifies that this is not a marginal occurrence.83 Medicaid di-

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

wrote on the SSI application that, while they are not married, “they hold themselves out to
the community as husband and wife,” and on a variety of other occasions they presented
themselves as husband and wife. Smith v. Sullivan, 767 F. Supp. 186, 187–88 (C.D. Ill.
1991). In the second reported case, in which the court rejected the Social Security
Administration’s finding that deemed a couple as married, the court noted that cohabitation
“is not a dispositive factor to be considered in the analysis.” Brown v. Apfel, No. 98-CIV2915-HB, 1999 WL 144515, at *1, *3 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 16, 1999).
Andrew D. Wone, Don’t Want to Pay for Your Institutionalized Spouse? The Role of Spousal
Refusal and Medicaid in Funding Long Term Care, 14 ELDER L.J. 485, 490–501 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (2006).
McNamara v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 744 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
But the noninstitutionalized spouse retains a small part of the couple’s resources without
affecting the eligibility of the institutionalized spouse.
Cf. HERTZ, supra note 52, at 196.
On the other hand, the status of “married” can be beneficial because it exempts jointly owned homes
from the spend-down requirement—a noteworthy advantage that nonmarital partners cannot enjoy.
Most unmarried partners, however, do not need this exemption in the first place.
Cf. Olver & Lee, supra note 37 (“Since recent changes to Medicaid rules in May 2006, the
‘Medicaid divorce’ has been resurrected as a planning tool.”).
Lawmakers did not ignore this phenomenon, constantly stating that “using a divorce
proceeding to accelerate Medicaid . . . violates public policy in general and the underlying
policy of the Medicaid Act.” H.K. v. Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Servs., 878 A.2d
16, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
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vorce presents a slightly different ethical question because it requires changing a
status rather than merely maintaining the status quo of staying unmarried.84
For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to focus on the way that unmarried
couples (rather than those who get divorced to achieve eligibility) can gain
from Medicaid.
2. Financial Aid for Higher Education
Eligibility for financial aid in postsecondary education is determined by
the Federal Student Aid, an office of the U.S. Department of Education. To
qualify for financial aid and determine the level of support that she is eligible
for, a student is required to fill out the Free Application for Federal Student
Aid form (FAFSA).85 The more financially needy the student is, the more
aid the student receives (up to a maximum level). The FAFSA is often also
used by colleges and universities to determine eligibility for nonfederal scholarships
and is required by virtually every U.S. college and university.86

84.

85.

86.

Ethically speaking, Medicaid divorce presents a slightly different situation than those that
were previously discussed, such as SSI and financial aid. The difference is that here couples
who may already be responsible to one another, and may have enjoyed some protections of
marriage, get divorced to avoid financial loss. While such an action can, in some cases, be
unethical, I do not think that it should be categorically perceived as unethical. The question
of ethics here should be examined case by case, according to the specific couple and the
specific circumstances. If the couple was economically and emotionally interdependent, there
may be a reason to view such act as unethical; but, in other cases, marriage status does not
mean that the couple had obligations that warrant combining their assets. In any event, the
ethical question is not material for purpose of this article. For a discussion of the ethics of
Medicaid divorce, see Randy Cohen, Get A Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2002, (“Ultimately,
the question is who should pay for your husband's care: Medicaid or you, the late-in-life
spouse? To me the answer is both. You should assist him but should not be utterly
impoverished. And Medicaid should be reformed so as to spare you this painful dilemma.
Medicaid rules envision a couple in a lifelong economic partnership. While this is true of
many couples, it is not the case for those like you who marry late in life.”); see also Abrams,
supra note 20, at 56–58 (arguing that marriage is a poor proxy for eligibility for benefits and
entitlements because marital status does not necessarily reflect interdependency).
See Forms and Worksheets, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWeb
App/students/english/forms.jsp (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). Using the information provided
on the Free Application for Federal Student Aid form (FAFSA), Federal Student Aid
calculates the student’s financial need based on his financial situation and the tuition costs of
the schools to which he is applying. Caroline Waldner, In Defense of College Savings Plans:
Using 529 Plans to Increase the Impact of Direct Federal Grants for Higher Education to Low-and
Moderate-Income Students, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 97, 128 n.101 (2011).
CROSBY BURNS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, UNEQUAL AID: DISCRIMINATORY
TREATMENT OF GAY AND TRANSGENDER APPLICANTS AND FAMILIES HEADED BY
SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCIAL AID PROCESS 5 (2011).
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In evaluating financial need, Federal Student Aid divides students into
two statuses: “dependent” on or “independent” of their parents for their tuition. Dependent students must report their parents’ income and assets, as
well as their own, on the FAFSA.87 Federal student aid programs are based
on the concept that a dependent student’s parents have the primary responsibility for paying for their child’s education.88 Family status could benefit the
student in two ways: First, if the student is dependent and her parents are
unmarried, it may reduce the total expected family contribution. Second, if
the student is independent, she would benefit by nondisclosure of her partner’s
income.89
Until the 2013–14 academic year, financial aid was one of the venues in
which unmarried students and students with unmarried parents could gain
from nonrecognition. But even under the new federal regulation discussed in
the introduction, students whose unmarried parents do not live together still
enjoy a significant financial advantage over similarly situated students with
married parents. Additionally, the change in the rule has not eliminated the
possible advantage of independent (from their parents) unmarried partners.
For purposes of determining the expected family contribution of the
student’s unmarried parents—whether the parents are divorced or were never
married—the dependent student should include on the FAFSA information
about the parent with whom she lived longer during the twelve months before
the date she completes the application. Thus, in many cases, if the legal parent informally lives with another person who is not the legal parent of the applicant and
not married to the applicant’s parent, the other partner’s income would not be
calculated, which would thus increase the student’s likelihood of eligibility
significantly. But, as stated before, if the applicant’s legal parents are unmarried and share residency, both incomes will be calculated and will decrease the
likelihood of eligibility and benefit level.
To demonstrate, consider the following scenario: Sylvia, Lori’s mother,
lives informally with Ari, who is not Lori’s father. Although Sylvia and Ari
are economically and emotionally interdependent, under the rules, because

87.
88.
89.

2011–2012 FSA HANDBOOK WITH ACTIVE INDEX, FEDERAL STUDENT AID AVG-21 (2011), available
at https://ifap.ed.gov/ifap/byAwardYear.jsp?type=fsahandbook&awardyear=2011-2012.
Id.
Of course, for the purposes of federal student aid, being married is beneficial for some
couples. According to the FAFSA, married couples, even those under twenty-four years old,
are considered independent, which is most often an advantage. Id. In another scenario, the
student applicant could have a spouse with an income lower than hers, which would increase
the household’s total income but also increase the family’s household size.
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they are unmarried,90 Ari’s income and presence in the household would not
be included on the application. That could inflate Lori’s financial aid package
significantly.91 Now assume that Ari and Sylvia are married (but still, Ari has
not legally adopted Lori or assumed other legal responsibility for her expenses
and well-being). Since information about stepparents, even with an existing
prenuptial agreement, is considered on the application,92 Lori will need to report
both incomes, thus arriving at a higher income, with three recognized persons
in her household.
In another scenario, Lori is a graduate student with no income, under
independent status because graduate students are automatically considered independent.93 Lori is engaged to Tom, whose annual income is $100,000. They have
been dating for ten years and Tom has been very financially supportive of
Lori.94 Under the rules, much of Tom’s support would be considered “in-kind
support,” which is not included on the application form.95 In sum, Lori’s status as
unmarried would probably increase the chances of her being eligible for financial aid.
It is thus safe to say that, even under the new rule, in an unknown number of
cases, living in informal relationships or having unmarried parents (who do
not share residence) is financially beneficial to people applying for student financial aid. Because, as stated before, students are a major group of cohabitants
and so are those in post-marital unions (parents of the students), financial aid
is a consequential instance in which nonrecognition is beneficial.96
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.

95.
96.

And assuming Ari does not contribute to more than half of Sylvia’s finances.
BURNS, supra note 86, at 8–11.
2011–2012 FSA HANDBOOK WITH ACTIVE INDEX, supra note 87, at AVG-29 (“A
stepparent is treated like a biological parent if the stepparent has legally adopted the student
or if the stepparent is married, as of the date of application, to a student’s biological or
adoptive parent whose information will be reported on the FAFSA. There are no exceptions.
A prenuptial agreement does not exempt the stepparent from providing information required
of a parent on the FAFSA.” (emphasis omitted)).
Id. at AVG-22.
Lori may need to report part of Tom’s support as “untaxed income” but not as spousal
income. Id. at AVG-20. For example, if her name is listed on the apartment’s lease and Tom
pays the rent, she needs to include this sum as support. But if her name is not on the lease,
she should not disclose the financial support. Id. If she is in a state that recognizes common
law marriages and, under the terms of the state, she is in such a union, then she is considered
married. But only a minority of states recognize common law marriage, and even in those, it
seems that Lori’s relationship might not be considered common law marriage—either
because the couple does not introduce themselves as spouses or because their time living
together would be considered a trial period, a premarital stage. See LIND, supra note 75, at
796–97.
2011–2012 FSA HANDBOOK WITH ACTIVE INDEX , supra note 87, at AVG-21.
Indeed, universities in the United States have recognized that “financial aid at universities is
often distorted for students with certain family circumstances,” and some universities employ their
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Post-Marital Entitlements

People who were previously married are one of the major groups who
live outside of marriage in the United States. In 2008, out of the total number of
households with nonmarital unions, almost 28 percent were such that both
partners were divorced, and 50 percent were such that at least one partner was
divorced.97 Divorced and widowed people can gain from being in an unrecognized relationship in four main areas: spousal support, Medicare, survivor’s
benefits, and Social Security retirement benefits. (In the case of spousal support,
however, there is a good chance that even without remarriage the benefits will
be terminated. I discuss this further in Part III.A.1.)
When a worker covered by Social Security dies, her surviving spouse (or
her ex-spouse, provided that they had been married for at least ten years) is
entitled to survivor’s benefits.98 But if the recipient remarries before she is
sixty years old, or fifty if she is disabled, then she loses the entitlement.99
Similarly, the former spouse of an insured person who is entitled to retirement
benefits under the Social Security Act may be eligible for benefits as a divorced
spouse (if they were married at least ten years).100 Nonetheless, upon her
remarriage, a divorced spouse typically cannot collect benefits on her former
spouse’s record.101 Correspondingly, if the insured ex-spouse is alive, remarriage of
the uninsured at any age precludes eligibility for Social Security and Medicare.102
Several recent studies confirm that eligibility for Social Security is decidedly
influential in the decisions of divorced and widowed people regarding their
living arrangements.103

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

102.
103.

own systems that try to fix these problems. Andrew Giambrone, Yale Resists Financial Aid Distortions,
YALE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2011/nov/04/yale-resistsfinancial-aid-distortions.
Kennedy & Fitch, supra note 40, at 1491.
See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (2006) (awarding survivor’s benefits). In order to be eligible, the spouses
had to have been married for at least ten years. 42 U.S.C § 416(d)(2) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1)(A)–(B) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2006) (divorced wife); 42 U.S.C. § 402(c) (2006) (divorced husband).
42 U.S.C.§ 402(b)(1)(C) (2006) (divorced wife); 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) (2006) (divorced
husband). The divorced can regain eligibility if their most recent marriage ends either by death,
divorce, or annulment. See RS 00202.046 Entitlement of a Divorced Spouse After Termination of
Subsequent Marriage - Policy, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/
0300202046 (last updated Feb. 12, 2013).
42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(H) (2006) (divorced wife); 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(H) (2006)
(divorced husband); Hospital Insurance, http://treasury.tn.gov/oasi/PDFs/MEDICAREINFORMATION.pdf.
See generally Gary V. Engelhardt, Social Security and Elderly Homeownership, 63 J. URBAN
ECON. 280 (2008) (concluding that reductions in Social Security benefits would significantly
alter the elderly homeownership rate, especially for widowed people); Gary V. Engelhardt,
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Marriage Penalty

Because of marital status alone, some married couples pay more income
tax than they would if they were unmarried, while others pay less. These policies
are known respectively as the “marriage penalty” and the “marriage bonus.”
Marriage penalties and bonuses result from tax code provisions that treat a
married couple as one taxable unit and an unmarried couple as two taxable
units.104 Because of this, sometimes—depending on a variety of such factors
as the gap in income between the partners, the number of children, etc.—
nonmarital partners pay less income tax by virtue of their “single” or “head of
household” filing status.105 Indeed, a body of research shows that “taxes have
a small but statistically significant effect on the decision whether to marry.”106
Inquiry into the complexities of the federal rate-tables and the various
ways that partners could gain or lose as a result of their nonmarital status exceeds
the scope of this Article.107 For the purposes of this Article, as a general principle, if the spouses’ incomes are fairly similar, then their tax liability will be
greater as joint filers than if they were not married and filed separately.108 In
other words, the tax system penalizes mainly dual-earner couples whose incomes are somewhat equal.109 Generally speaking—except for the extreme
case in which a couple obviously divorces to file taxes as separate individuals
and then remarries—the state does not target people who strategically do not

104.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Jonathan Gruber & Cynthia D. Perry, Social Security and Elderly Living Arrangements, 40 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 354 (2005).
I.R.C. § 6013(a) (West 2011) (“A husband and wife may make a single return jointly of
income taxes under subtitle A, even though one of the spouses has neither gross income nor
deductions . . . .”); I.R.C. § 1 (West 2011) (creating four filing statuses: married filing jointly,
married filing separately, single, or head of household). The lack of marriage neutrality is
also the result of progressive rather than proportional tax rates. See Whittington & Alm,
supra note 25, at 82–83.
See HERTZ, supra note 52, at 117–26.
Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does Love (of Money) Have to Do
With Joint Tax Filing?, 11 NEV. L.J. 718, 749 (2011).
For a general list of possible tax advantages for unmarried couples, see Lauren J. Wolven,
Estate Planning for Unmarried Adults, ST042 ALI-ABA 575 (2012).
Abrams, supra note 20, at 15–16.
Nevertheless, even low-earner couples can benefit from not being married. A study based on
data from the 2002 National Survey of America’s Families found that about half of
unmarried cohabitants would have owed more taxes if they were married. Gregory Acs &
Elaine Maag, Irreconcilable Differences? The Conflict between Marriage Promotion Initiatives for
Cohabiting Couples With Children and Marriage Penalties in Tax and Transfer Programs, NEW
FEDERALISM: NAT’L SURVEY OF AM.’S FAMILIES 3 (Urban Inst. Ser. No. B-66, 2005).
But the study predicted that, due to some changes in provisions such as the Earned Income
Tax Credit, by 2008, the percentage of low-income taxpayers (unmarried couples with
children) facing marriage tax penalties would fall to 10.5 percent. Id. at 4.
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get married or who strategically divorce just to avoid the tax penalty.110 Obviously,
this description does not purport to find all the tax loopholes that unmarried
couples can use—they are numerous, cannot easily be recognized, and change
every year.
***
This short and nonexhaustive summary illustrates that family law must
address the potential financial benefit that stems from being unrecognized,
both because there are several areas in which this status is beneficial, and because
there is significant evidence—anecdotal and otherwise—that many people are
affected by these benefits. The account also shows that, for the most part,
vulnerable populations are those who benefit financially from nonrecognition:
elderly, higher education students, and the poor. But, as I show in Part II, the
separation between poverty law and family law has rendered these segments
of the population invisible to family law—the ways in which recognition of
these relationships can harm people are given scant attention in the legal
scholarship.
II.

THE TREND TOWARD RECOGNITION AND ITS EFFECT
ON THE CURRENTLY UNRECOGNIZED

Here, I give an account of the current legal landscape for nonmarital unions
in the United States. My primary aim is to explore the potential ramifications
of legal recognition of currently unrecognized relationships, in particular for
those populations discussed above.
In order to understand both the existing law and policy that govern
unmarried partners as well as proposals for legal reform, it is imperative first
to comprehend the hurdles that nonrecognized partners face. I start by
providing a brief analysis of the legal issues associated with the proliferation
of nonmarital arrangements in the United States. Specifically, I break down
the injuries from legal nonrecognition to the resultant economic and dignitary
inequities. Then, in Part II.B, I introduce the trend toward recognition by
presenting both the existing legal terrain and major proposals for policy
110. In response to a tax-motivated divorce, the sham-transaction doctrine could be applied so

that the divorced couple would be deemed to have filed their taxes returns as “married.”
Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981). But since the sham-transaction doctrine
is limited only to those who remarry after divorce, tax-motivated divorce is still an option for
those who do not remarry, whether or not they continue to live together. Abrams, supra note
20, at 25–27; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-350-76 (June 1, 1978).
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change. In Part II.C, I consider the ways in which the trend toward recognition can harm those who currently enjoy financial benefits from nonrecognition.
A.

How Marriage Exceptionalism Results in Cultural
and Economic Injustices

Despite the prevalence of various family arrangements, the law does not
provide unmarried partners the protections they need or an efficient supportive
framework around which to organize the legal issues that stem from their relationships.111 The difficulty is that the law of domestic relations is strongly
focused on the married couple as the unit that deserves the law’s respect and
protection, to the exclusion of others. This is what can be called marriage
exceptionalism. The forfeit that is caused to families that fall outside the
scope of the law can be significant. During their relationship, unmarried
partners are ineligible for hundreds of rights, benefits, and protections that
are granted to married couples by the state (including the federal government)
and by third parties.112 Examples include tax breaks and immigration benefits
from the federal government, eligibility for health insurance, and sick days
from employers.113 Upon the end of their relationships—either due to death
or breakup—unmarried couples cannot claim exemptions from the estate tax
nor claim intestate inheritance rights.114 Additionally, the law imposes default
obligations on spouses vis-à-vis each other during and upon the end of the
relationship, such as a duty of support (during the relationship) and division
of property and alimony (at the end of the relationship).115 Similar obligations are not automatically prescribed for unmarried partners.116
Deprived of state protection, people in nonmarital unions can suffer
economic injustice and dignitary-cultural harm—two injuries that occasionally intersect, though neither is merely an effect of the other. The classic case often goes as follows: An unmarried, opposite-sex couple lived in a
common residence, had children, and developed economic and emotional

111.
112.
113.
114.

See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 587 (2013).
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955–56 (Mass. 2003) (listing
the protections and benefits that stem from marriage).
115. Id.
116. In Washington state, partners are presumed to have obligations toward one another in terms
of property distribution. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
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interdependency.117 Upon the end of the relationship, the woman partner
(often) is left without rights in the once-shared property or rights to financial
support because cohabitation does not automatically bring with it those legal
obligations on the part of her partner.118 In such case, the economic injustice
is quite clear. The weaker party, who invested in domestic work and raised
the children while providing the partner the opportunity to invest in his career, is
left with few or no resources.119 The economic injustice in this case also reflects a
devaluation of domestic work and child rearing, work which is traditionally
done by women; the injustice is often further exacerbated by existing inequalities in the employment market.120 The dignitary harm results from the
fact that only marriage is respected and recognized as a relationship worthy of
state protection. Further, by not recognizing nonmarital relationships, the state
devalues people’s autonomy to choose the family structure they want. The
state imposes a framework (marriage) that may be undesirable for some and
stigmatizes nonmarital relationships by treating them as inferior.121 To illuminate, were the partners married, the economic and cultural harms would
have been prevented, as the law imposes financial duties on the partners upon
divorce (unless they have opted-out by signing prenuptial agreement), and
the marital status is respected by the state.
Similarly, nonrecognition of nonconjugal relationships could also generate
economic injustice and dignitary-cultural harm. I use the example of
nonrecognition of friendships to illustrate. By not recognizing friendships,
the state withholds from friends a variety of economic benefits—for example,
eligibility to inherit each other’s estates under state intestacy rules, and standing to
sue for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by a friend’s death.122
As for the dignitary aspect, the state creates a hierarchy of relationships that
favors domestic caregiving and intimate relationships over others. Such a system
generates stigma and even loneliness for those who live in nonsanctioned
relationships, eventually leading some people to feel that being unmarried is
117. Cf. Alicia Brokars Kelly, Actualizing Intimate Partnership Theory, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 263

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

(2012) (“The harms caused are especially acute for cohabitants, for women, and for same-sex
couples. Caregivers, who are usually women, tend to disproportionately bear earning power
disadvantages produced by communal choices.”).
This is, of course, provided that the couple did not sign a cohabitation agreement that secures
these rights (and would be generally enforced in all but three states).
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 155 (1993); cf.
Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 267–68 (2001).
See, e.g., Alicia Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth
Distribution at Divorce: In Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 141, 162 (2004).
See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 119, at 93.
See Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 204–05 (2007).
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being a failure.123 Marriage exceptionalism also entrenches the symbolic
harm of marriage and the harm of being single by signaling that the path to
success necessarily follows marriage.124 Having more than one state-sanctioned
relationship might eliminate some of this dignitary injury both by reducing
the significance of any one type of relationship and by elevating the status of
particular alternative relationships as well.125 This legal structure also adversely
affects predominantly women because the state directs people to choose only
one comprehensive domestic relationship, in which an extensive amount of
domestic care is expected. Since women are still more likely to be the main
caregiver, this structure maintains traditional gender roles.126
Responding to the growing number of nonmarital arrangements and the
harm caused by their legal maltreatment, scholars, courts, and policy makers
have long contemplated the proper policy approach. The following Subpart
surveys a few of them and analyzes the different, sometimes contradictory, legal doctrines, proposals, and theories.
B.

The Trend Toward Legal Recognition

In this Subpart, I sketch the complicated terrain of legal recognition of
nonmarital unions in the United States.127 My aim is to establish that legal
recognition of nonnuclear families is on the rise. At the same time, I indicate
how in practice, legal recognition of nonmarital unions is quite limited.

123. Cf. Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2689 (2008)

124.
125.

126.
127.

(“The normative centrality and, indeed, priority of the institution of marriage establishes
the standard by which all other forms of kinship, family, friendship, temporary alliance,
and love are both rendered legible and assigned value. In this, and in most societies,
marriage is the measure of all things. Thus, affective associations that lie outside the
formal paling of marriage are evaluated and understood by virtue of their likeness to, or dissimilarity
from, marriage.”).
See, e.g., JOHN SCANZONI ET AL., THE SEXUAL BOND: RETHINKING FAMILIES AND
CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 72 (1989); Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 217, 228.
Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 228 (“Explicit legal recognition of friendship could soften the
effects of the state’s current, implicit regulation of friendship by signaling that friendship is
worthy of state support. Such signaling might eliminate some of the stigma experienced by
people living outside of state-sanctioned coupling, because other personal relationships would
be recognized by the state.”).
See id. at 191.
It is a complicated terrain for two reasons. First, it includes different players who are pushing
in different directions: courts, scholars, policy makers, and the affected people themselves.
Second, often the doctrine itself does not adequately describe the reality; for example, the implied contract doctrine that is supposed to “protect” cohabitants in reality provides very little
protection.
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Acknowledging the harm to unmarried families caused by marriage
exceptionalism, legal scholars have offered a variety of proposals to reduce it.
With strikingly few exceptions,128 the remedy to this injustice is pinned to legal recognition of relationships.129 More recognition includes more types of
familial relationships—such as friendships,130 relatives,131 cohabiting conjugal
couples,132 caregiving relations,133 and nonmonogamous relationships134—and
more types of legal institutions. In the following, I discuss a select,
nonexhaustive list of suggested and existing policies that are indicative of the
general trend.135
In the zone of cohabiting couples, at least on the surface, there is an increasing
recognition and enforcement of obligations between intimate unmarried couples.
Following a ruling of the California Supreme Court in 1977 in the case of
Marvin v. Marvin,136 most states enforce contractual financial obligations between
128. See Franke, supra note 123, at 2703 (“Some of the recent scholarship urging the legal

129.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

136.

regulation of friendship strikes me as radically wrongheaded. Unfortunately, this work
indulges the misplaced view that, if something important is at stake, law should regulate it.”
(citation omitted)); see also Abrams, supra note 20, at 6 (“[W]e should isolate and
disaggregate the various state interests in marriage and then reconfigure marriage to retain
those features relevant to salient interests and to discard those relating to interests that would
be better dealt with elsewhere.”); Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and
Countermarriage, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 235, 263–66 (2011) (imagining a world in which the
state refuses to enforce contracts between romantic partners, and, while arguing that such
regime is very unlikely, providing some reasonable justifications for such policy).
Elsewhere, I divided the proposals into four groups: traditionalism, which advocates
maintaining marriage’s special status because it is the best framework to organize and
privatize support between family members; abolitionism, which urges the abolition of
marriage and a shift to a contractual regime; functionalism, which promotes legal recognition
of relationships according to the family’s function rather than its status; and a menu-ofoptions approach, which supports the creation of a plurality of state-sanctioned institutions
for recognition of relationships. See Aloni, supra note 111, at 594–606.
See infra notes 154–156, 158 and accompanying text (discussing a few proposals for inclusion
of friendships in family law).
See infra notes 164, 274, 305 and accompanying text (discussing Nancy Polikoff’s proposal).
See infra notes 146–147, 149, 175–176 and accompanying text (discussing Cynthia Bowman’s
proposal and ALI proposal).
See infra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing Martha Fineman’s approach).
See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for
Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010) (advocating for recognition of polygamy to the
extent that it is effectively regulated).
Because “[s]cholarly literature over the last several decades has been flooded” with theories to
legally recognize nonmarital unions, I will have to limit the discussion to a small number of
major theories, while neglecting many of them. Alicia Brokars Kelly, Explaining Intuitions:
Relating Mergers, Contribution, and Loss in the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 185, 186 (2001).
See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (holding that contractual obligations
between unmarried partners are enforceable in California). Marvin also specifically approved
the use of equitable remedies when warranted by the circumstances presented by the case.
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unmarried couples upon dissolution of the relationship.137 In reality, however, a
Marvin-type remedy provides very little protection to unmarried couples because
some courts enforce only written contracts or demand clear and convincing
evidence in order to find obligations between the partners.138 Courts also
tend to ascribe obligations mostly in cases in which there was explicit financial contribution by the claimant (for example, if the party invested some
amount in the property or in other mutual expenses).139
In addition, but more rarely, status-based recognition is also sometimes
available for cohabitants. At least one state (Washington) offers more robust
protection to unmarried couples because the court holds just division of property as a rebuttable presumption if the cohabitants at stake behaved in a marriedlike fashion.140 In 2002, the American Law Institute (ALI) suggested a
somewhat similar model.141 According to the ALI’s Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, couples who either maintain a common household for a
state-defined period or raise a child together will be presumed “domestic
partners.”142 Domestic partners are then treated as married in terms of

137.

138.
139.
140.

141.

142.

Id.; see also BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 38–45 (surveying equitable remedies for unmarried
couples and criticizing their inadequacy).
Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1383 (2001)
(“[M]ost states’ courts routinely enforce express agreements and recognize various equitable
claims between unmarried partners, particularly where they share a business or property.”).
Only four states (Illinois, Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana) do not enforce contracts
between nonmarital couples at all. See Aloni, supra note 111, at 587.
See BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 50–52; HERTZ, supra note 52, at 12–14.
See Estin, supra note 137, at 1384.
See, e.g., Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 350 (Wash. 2007) (establishing the term “law of
committed intimate relationships”); Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 739 (Wash. 2001)
(Sanders J., concurring) (“Relevant factors establishing a meretricious relationship include,
but are not limited to: continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the
relationship, pooling of resources and services for joint projects, and the intent of the
parties.”); HERTZ, supra note 52, at 13–14.
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002). Elizabeth Scott offered a more moderate approach.
According to her proposal, cohabiting couples who share a child or live together for five years
would assume financial marital-like obligations upon separation unless they opt out. See
Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott, Legal Regulation of Twenty-First-Century Families, in
MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 14, at 303, 317.
See AM. LAW INST., supra note 141, § 6.03. While the ALI principles leave it to the
legislature to decide what the required cohabitation period is, the principles seem to
recommend, based on other countries’ experiences, that the cohabitation period for couples
with a common child will be two years and for couples without a common child, three years.
See id. § 6.03 cmt. d. The principles also add factors that can rebut the presumption created
by the length of cohabitation. The same factors can be used to establish the presumption in
cases in which the cohabitation time was shorter than required by the statute.
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maintenance and distribution of property upon separation.143 Couples who
want to opt out of this default need a prior written agreement. This proposal,
however, has not been adopted by any state,144 and has been widely criticized
for being too inclusive because it may impose marital obligations on people
who may be uninterested in taking on such obligations.145
In any event, even under the ALI proposal, unmarried partners are still
deprived of a variety of rights and benefits that are provided by the state and
third parties to married partners during their relationships. Thus, Cynthia
Bowman suggests that relationships of unmarried opposite-sex couples who
share the same residence (for more than two years) or have a common child
(regardless of the time they share a residence) should be recognized by the
state and third parties as “quasi-married.”146 That means that the couple’s obligations toward each other would be similar to those of married couples, and
the state and third parties would treat the couple as married for all purposes.147
While this proposal is considered by some to be improbable as a candidate for adoption,148 the states that recognize common law marriage—a minority
of states—already do deem some couples as married for all purposes even if
they have not formally entered into marriage. This is, of course, a very different
landscape because, contrary to Bowman’s proposal, couples need to hold
themselves out as married in order to be recognized as such—a much more
demanding requirement than merely two years of sharing a residence.149 Despite
the national trend to repeal common law marriage, Utah recently enacted
common law marriage.150 The reason for such enactment was to prevent
polygamists from using the welfare system in a “fraudulent manner.”151 The

143. See id. § 6.0.
144. See BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 3.
145. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 250, 262–63 (2004); Franke, supra note 123, at
2697 (“Thus, the law opts them into a marriage-like regime whether or not they reached a
mutual explicit agreement that they desired or intended to acquire this status. . . . The
intended effect of the ALI Principles is to enlarge marriage law’s shadow.”). The ALI
proposal has also been criticized by conservative commentators because they view it as
weakening the marriage institution.
BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 221–24.
See id.
Cf. Aloni, supra note 111, at 603–06 (criticizing Bowman’s proposal because it is, in essence,
another path into marriage).
BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 5–6 (contending that common law marriage is an inadequate
remedy for the treatment of unmarried couples because even married people today do not
necessarily present themselves as husband and wife, but rather as partners).
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (2007).
See Abrams, supra note 20, at 29.
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concern was that in a polygamist’s household, in which the man officially is
married only to one woman but in practice cohabits with more, the unmarried
women would receive welfare benefits as if they were single.152
As stated before, legal recognition claims are not limited to intimate
partnerships. Surprisingly, even though family law has only recently concerned
itself with the issue of friendships, it appears that this subject has already
gained popularity in scholarship (as evidenced by the number of articles that
discuss it).153 Commentators who ask for legal regulation of friendships take
different stands in terms of the type of legal recognition they suggest. David
Chambers advocates the creation of a “designated friends” registry that would
offer friends a limited number of privileges and responsibilities relating to the
care of each other.154 Laura Rosenbury “calls for explicit state recognition of
friendship” based on the “principles of nonexclusivity and fluidity.”155 Her
general approach would have the state provide an individual the opportunity
to designate more than one person for state protections and benefits. She rejects, however, a friendship registry as the sole solution, and even rejects a dual
registry (one that would allow designation of both a best friend and an intimate partner) because they require people to choose only one friend and
would privilege one type of relationship over others. More theoretically,
Katherine Franke suggests that because friendship can take many shapes, is
very flexible, and “occupies a social space largely unregulated by law,” friendship
(rather than marriage) can serve as a paradigm for “our reasoning about sexual
and affective liberty.”156 Ethan Leib, on the other hand, proposes lighter regulation of friendships.157 In short, he proposes that friends should be able to
take medical leave to help sick friends, have standing to sue for wrongful
death, be eligible for tax deductions for their care of friends, and be treated as
holding fiduciary duties in cases of economic transition between friends.158
While the recognition of nonintimate partners in the manner that is
proposed by these scholars seems far away, a few states have started to recognize
nonintimate unions for particular purposes. Recently, for instance, California

152. See id.
153. See infra notes 154–158 and accompanying text.
154. See David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for Lovers of All Sorts, a Status Other Than
155.
156.
157.
158.

Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1353–55 (2001); see also Aloni, supra note 111, at
607–13 (suggesting a relationship registration scheme that would also be open to friends).
Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 229.
Franke, supra note 123, at 2702–03.
ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP—AND
WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT 78–107 (2011).
Id.
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passed a law that exempts unmarried partners who co-own property in joint
tenancy from reassessment of property tax when their property changes hands
after the death of a partner.159 According to its terms, this law could be applied to
nonintimate couples who share a residence. Other states and federal programs
have also changed their rules so that benefits are available to nonconjugal
partners.160 In addition, two states, Hawaii and Vermont, provide a registration
scheme for nonconjugal partners that confers a limited panoply of rights and
benefits. In Hawaii, the registration is open to everyone who is prohibited
from marriage (same-sex couples and nonintimate partners, including friends
and relatives),161 but in Vermont the registration is open only to people with
familial relationships.162 These two legal institutions have not proven widely
popular and very few nonintimate partners have registered.163
Two other prominent models that shift the focus from marriage to the
functional family are those posited by Nancy Polikoff and Martha Fineman.
In the shortest version, Polikoff’s account calls for valuing all families. She
asks that families be recognized by their function rather than by marriage or
by any status. Her three key principles are: preferring the needs of children
and their caretakers over other adult relationships, supporting the children’s
needs in all types of families, and acknowledging adult interdependency.164
Fineman asserts that protections and support should essentially be directed to
vertical (intergenerational) caregiving relationships rather than to traditional
horizontal relationships between adults (spouses).165
Finally, another influential approach in the trend toward recognition is
the pluralistic policy, also known as the menu-of-options proposal.166 Proponents
of this approach advocate the creation of a variety of state-supported legal
mechanisms for recognition of different types of relationships.167 Shahar
Lifshitz, for instance, proposes a pluralist theory that emphasizes the state’s
159. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 62.5 (West 2012).
160. For example, until 2006, an inherited pension could be exempted from tax if the spouse rolled
161.
162.
163.

164.
165.
166.
167.

the fund into her own retirement account. In 2006, the U.S. Congress passed a bill that allows
any beneficiary to move the fund without paying tax. See POLIKOFF, supra note 48, at 191.
See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1 et seq. (2011).
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1303 (2011).
Aloni, supra note 111, at 592–93 (“These statutes are thus very limited in their scope and do
not provide alternatives for opposite-sex couples in conjugal relationships, nor, in Vermont,
do they provide such alternatives for non-intimate partners. It is no wonder, then, that the
number of registrations is extremely small.”).
See POLIKOFF supra note 48, at 137–38.
See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 6–8 (1995).
Id. at 599–601 (explaining the pluralistic approach and criticizing it for lack of coherence).
See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1772 (2005).
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obligation to create a range of legal institutions that offer meaningful choices
to individuals in organizing their relationships.168 In particular, he asserts
that such an approach needs to attach different consequences to marriage
than to nonmarital unions. In fact, a feeble menu of options has already
emerged in some places: Civil unions and other somewhat similar legal institutions—some of them also open to opposite-sex couples—already exist in
several states.169 But like the previously discussed registration schemes in
Hawaii and Vermont, the existing legal institutions have not as of yet been
endorsed by the public.170
In sum, the movements back and forth toward recognition and away
from recognition still comprise a very lively and developing area of the law.
Legal scholarship has generally been supportive of the expansion of recognition to include more family structures.171 Courts, at least when it comes to the
recognition of nonmarital unions, have been more reluctant to afford protections
to unmarried couples. Legislatures are moving between more recognition
and restricting recognition. As acknowledged by Eskridge, “[f]or most states,
the menu of relationship regimes has developed haphazardly and without a
systematic public debate about the effects of the menu.”172 Notwithstanding
the various directions supported by different state and private agents, the enterprise
of expanding recognition is already a fact.173 Development is proceeding in a
strong overall direction—toward more recognition.
Almost completely ignored by the celebration of recognition is the range
of arenas in which people can benefit financially from nonrecognition. The

168. See Lifshitz, supra note 16. William N. Eskridge proposes that some menus of options

169.
170.

171.

172.
173.

already exist for the U.S. family because most states offer ex-post recognition of cohabiting
couples and some offer civil unions or additional state-sanctioned legal institutions. See
William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default
Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881 (2012).
See Aloni, supra note 111, 591–94 (surveying the different registration schemes that exist).
See id. at 592–93. One of the reasons that these legal institutions have not shown success is
that they were created as compromises to block or delay the legalization of same-sex marriage. As
such, they are perceived as inferior to marriage; and, commonly, when same-sex marriage is
legalized, these institutions are abolished. Notwithstanding this pessimistic description, I
have elsewhere argued that these institutions have a potential to develop into meaningful
marriage alternatives. Id. at 627–28.
The main exception to the trend toward more recognition is traditionalists’ opposition to the
expansion of legal recognition of nonmarital families. Traditionalists argue that marriage is
the best framework for raising children and should be treated differently from other family
structures. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, The Family Law Doctrine of Equivalence, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 999 (2009).
Eskridge, supra note 168, at 1891.
Id. at 1889.
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following Subpart asks how the existence of this significant phenomenon pertains
to the trend toward recognition.
C.

Recognizing Nonrecognition

Legal scholarship has failed to engage with the question of how increasing legal recognition might affect the lives of those who gain financially from
nonrecognition. On the most basic level, this shortcoming is expressed by legal
scholars’ widespread failure to even consider this phenomenon and the way it
may affect their theories. Perhaps this neglect is correlated to family law’s
separation from poverty law and the former’s tendency to address the entrance to
and exit from relationships to the exclusion of addressing ongoing family
life.174 This Subpart begins filling in this serious gap in the scholarship.
Bowman’s proposal to recognize all cohabiting couples as quasi-married
after two years of cohabitation or having a child is an example of a theory
more focused on subjects that traditionally have been considered part of family
law—here, the vulnerability of women upon the ending of relationships—
rather than on those that have been excluded by family law, such as poor
families.175 (The proposal is similar in its effect to Utah’s recognition of
common law marriage, which, as stated above, meant specifically to prevent
use of the welfare system.) Bowman briefly discusses the possibility that under her
proposed regime some people will lose assistance from states’ social welfare
programs. She does not consider, however, other types of forfeits under her
regime, such as the loss of post-marital benefits (survivor’s benefits) or financial
aid.176 With regard to the potential loss of welfare grants, Bowman contends
that in cases in which the cohabiting man is working, the fact that these couples
will be treated as married for all other purposes compensates for the possible
ending of welfare for them—for example, by extension of employer-based
health insurance.177 Otherwise, she adds, a study found that unmarried women
from poor backgrounds are aware of the risks of living with unproductive men

174. See Halley & Rittich, supra note 26, at 764.
175. See BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 244 (concluding that when she envisions remedies for the

legal treatment of cohabitants, she has in mind a woman who tries to leave her abusive
husband, and explains how her remedy is suitable to handle such a case).
176. Id. at 240–41. In a footnote, and without further discussion, Bowman refers to an article that
suggests the option of creating a “statewide civil union” as a solution to the problems
associated with elderly who could lose their post-marital entitlements and benefits. See John
R. Schleppenbach, Strange Bedfellows: Why Older Straight Couples Should Advocate for the
Passage of the Illinois Civil Union Act, 17 ELDER L.J. 31, 51–53 (2009).
177. BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 240–41.
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and are determined to protect themselves;178 further, Bowman states that the
division of property at the end of the relationships will protect the women.
Bowman’s argument, however, is not entirely convincing because cohabitation is very common among low-income groups. Low-income partners
would be unlikely to enjoy the benefits of property distribution or estate tax
exemptions (people at the poverty level typically do not own significant property)
or the extension of health insurance (if they are unemployed, or if their
employer does not provide health insurance).179 In many instances the couple
would be better off with access to Medicaid, SSI, food stamps, housing, welfare,
and the like.180
Less inclusive proposals—those that impose obligations only at the end
of nonmarital relationships—could also, in time, be harmful to couples who
gain financially from nonrecognition. This is because such proposals do not
contemplate whether ascribing obligations between the partners would
someday result in more state control over the partners, especially regarding
more vulnerable populations. That is, when the state ascribes obligations between
the partners, it could (at least theoretically) enforce obligations for other matters,
such as support during the relationship (and thus reduce or eliminate eligibility for means-tested programs).
To illustrate, consider Lifshitz’s pluralistic approach and the ALI recommendations. According to Lifshitz, the state should treat cohabitation and
marriage as completely distinct legal institutions; and, within cohabitations,
different legal consequences should be applied to “regular cohabitation”
(short-term cohabitation) and “relational cohabitation” (longer-term cohabitation).181 Such an approach does not provide answers to a few fundamental
questions concerning the duties that result from recognition.182 In particular,

178. Id. at 240 (referring to KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP:

WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005)).
179. Even under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, employers who have fewer than

fifty employees do not have to insure their employees.
180. The concern is that as a result of calculating in the income of the man—who may not even

contribute to the household—eligibility would be jeopardized or benefit levels reduced. If
the affected women want to protect themselves from this consequence, according to
Bowman’s suggestion they could either avoid living with these men—which may not be what
they want—or register as domestic partners—something that is unlikely that they would do,
and that could also have other ramifications, as I explain below. Id.
181. Lifshitz, supra note 16, at 1604–07.
182. For example, should the fact that one of the partners gains economically from nonrecognition
affect their mutual obligations at the end of the relationship? Similarly, Lifshitz’s theory
gives heavy weight to the types of relationships and to the way that the type of relationship
matters for purposes of determining the legal consequences of the dissolution. Maybe, then,
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the scheme does not indicate what exactly the relationship between the couple and
third parties, including the state, should be. This is problematic because if
the state mandates that some relationships carry the legal consequence of
equal division of property at the end of the relationships, it may create a property
right on behalf of both partners even before the separation. (For example, in
a common law state, a presumption of tenancy by the entirety could be established, if parties meet the criteria that establish a status or presumption.) It
thus makes sense that the state would recognize these mutual obligations vis-à-vis
other duties, such as mutual responsibility for Medicaid eligibility. If married
couples need to spend-down their assets when partners apply for Medicaid,
there are no compelling reasons for the state to treat differently cohabitants
who have legal obligations toward each other.183 This is even more apparent
with regard to the ALI proposal, which creates a couple’s status after a few
years of their living together. If a domestic partnership status is established
after a specific time, then when one individual applies for welfare and lives
with another person longer than the term that establishes the partners’ status—a
status that raises a presumption of mutual obligations—then it makes some
sense to treat these partners as one unit in a way that could reduce eligibility
for means-tested programs.184

economic gain as a motivation changes couples’ classification; for example, from “regular
cohabitants” to “relational cohabitants.”
183. The difference between the two situations is that marriage is a clearly registered status, while
in Lifshitz’s proposal the status could be established only upon the dissolution of the bond.
184. An additional problem in the menu-of-options approach is the assumption that state registrations
(for domestic partnership or civil unions) would likely not be recognized by the federal government,
including for purposes of eliminating benefits. A common suggestion in legal scholarship is that
state registration is the solution for the elderly. See Barry Kozak, Civil Unions in Illinois: Issues That
Illinois Attorneys Should Consider, 25 CBA Rec. 30, 34 (2011).
Indeed, three states (Washington, California, and New Jersey) open their registration to
couples who are over sixty-two, for the same reason. See HERTZ, supra note 52, at 209 n.3.
The rationale behind this policy is that the elderly would want to have a way to arrange their
mutual lives (having medical decisionmaking privileges, for example) but without risking
their eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid.
But it is far from clear that the federal government will ignore registered unions of the
elderly for purposes of calculating benefits and eligibility. As we have seen, in Medicaid, the
state deems couples who hold themselves out as married as, indeed, married, and there is no
better sign of being a couple than being registered as a couple. Moreover, due to a recent
decision of the IRS to treat opposite-sex couples under civil unions in Illinois as married for
the purpose of filing joint tax returns, it is really an unresolved question if the current
situation (in which the federal government does not withhold benefits based on state
registration) will continue. Letter from Pamela Wilson Fuller, Senior Technician Reviewer,
Internal Revenue Serv., to Robert Shair, Senior Tax Advisor, H&R Block (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://law.scu.edu/blog/samesextax/file/IRS%20Civil%C20Union%20letter.pdf. Similarly,
there is no reason to believe that low-income and poor people will register if there is a risk
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The assumption that the adoption of the above-mentioned proposals
will harm more vulnerable populations and will be used by the state to further
privatize mutual support between unmarried couples is not without empirical
support. Rather, the experience of other countries that have adopted progressive
policies that recognize unmarried couples teach that legal recognition is for
better and for worse.
In Australia, for example, partners (opposite- or same-sex) who live together,
are over the age of consent, and are not in a prohibited relationship are recognized
as “de facto partners.”185 The criteria for “de facto relationships” include the
time the partners lived together, their reputation, and financial interdependency.186
Recognition as de facto partners provides a handful of important rights and
benefits but also considerable obligations, including possible reductions in social
welfare grants. Acquiring “de facto partners” status is not based merely on the
partners’ definitions of their relationships; rather, recognition can be involuntary, based on the decision of the Australian Department of Human Services.187
That is, even “[i]f people do not tell Centrelink [a division of Australian’s
Social Security] about their circumstances, it is possible that Centrelink may
investigate and find that there is a relationship and then raise a debt against
the persons involved and possibly prosecute them.”188 If a couple falls under
the definition of de facto partners, the partners’ incomes and assets will be
calculated together for eligibility for welfare, which might result in the reduction of welfare grants or even the elimination of grants that are restricted to
singles (such as welfare grants to single parents).
In what sounds like a relevant warning to the U.S., a booklet provided by
the (Australian) National Welfare Rights Network and the Illawarra Legal
Centre explains that “[t]he laws have changed to eliminate discrimination

185.
186.
187.
188.

that their SSI or Medicaid eligibility will be revoked. More generally, status change has
consequences, even under state laws, that needs to be taken into account.
For instance, state law creates obligations between the partners, such as joint liability for
debt, which can cause some people not to register. Or even more relevant, as I explain in Part
III, in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) it is the state that defines the
assistance unit. Therefore, for some people, it is uncertain that registration schemes would
have a positive effect.
Australian Government, Guide to Social Security Law, Section 2.2.5.10 Determining a De Facto
Relationship, http://guidesacts.fahcsia.gov.au/guides_acts/ssg/ssguide-2/ssguide-2.2/ssguide2.2.5/ssguide-2.2.5.10.html (last updated May 3, 2010).
See POLIKOFF, supra note 48, at 116–17.
It is different from deprivative recognition, because partners in de facto relationships are
recognized for benefits and responsibilities, rather than only for responsibilities like in
deprivative recognition.
NAT’L WELFARE RIGHTS NETWORK & ILLAWARRA LEGAL CENTRE, RELATIONSHIPS
AND CENTRELINK: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 (2009).
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towards same sex couples; however the impact in the area of Social Security is
causing problems for many couples who do not want to be public about their
relationships.”189
The Australian experience thus should serve as a caution to the legal
scholarship that advocates the adoption of progressive and functional policies
for recognition of nonmarital unions. In fact, in the United States, partners
are already recognized against their will—solely for the withholding of
grants—even without the accompanying progressive policy of recognizing
unmarried partners for purposes of benefits. Part III explores those cases.
III.

PIERCING THE VEIL OF NONRECOGNITION

The inadequate engagement of legal scholarship with the duties that are
attached to legal recognition results in part from an incomplete understanding of ascriptive recognition. In this Part, I first parse out the different types
of ascriptive recognition. In particular, I distinguish between purely ascriptive
recognition and partially ascriptive recognition. Partially ascriptive recognition
is a phenomenon that is already recognized in the scholarship—but is referred
to simply as ascriptive—in which the state ascribes marital-like obligations to
couples at the end of relationships, upon the request of one of the partners.190
I argue that the cases in which a partner petitions for economic rights as
against the other partner upon separation should be treated as partially
ascriptive—legal recognition in those cases simply results from the request of
one of the parties. In other words, the state merely takes one side as a response to a dispute between the parties. Conversely, I discuss purely
ascriptive recognition: cases in which the state recognizes partners without a
request by either party.
Importantly, purely ascriptive recognition does not have to be
deprivative. In the future, it is plausible that the state would decide to define
a family unit without the partners’ request, but in a way that would not result
in deprivation. For example, under Bowman’s plan, some people who would
be recognized by the state incur benefits and duties at the same time. Such

189. Id.
190. Marsha Garrison calls the mechanism of providing ex-post marital-like obligations on

couples upon separation “conscriptive” rather than “ascriptive” in order “to emphasize the fact
that the obligations imposed by laws of this type are both compulsory and involuntary.”
Garrison, supra note 41, at 324 n.88. But whether you call this legal fiction conscriptive or
ascriptive, the economic rights in these cases are being requested by one of the partners,
unlike the cases I discuss in which the recognition is conferred by the state when neither party
is interested in having that status.
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policy, for some people, will not be deprivative—the involuntary recognition
will not result in economic maldistribution. Similarly, the Australian approach described above (recognizing partners against their will for terminating benefits
that stem from nonrecognition) is not necessarily deprivative, because the parties
can be recognized for purposes of protections and benefits as well. This Part,
however, focuses exclusively on one subcategory of purely ascriptive recognition: deprivative recognition—the only existing policy that defines partners as
a unit against the will of both parties and results in deprivation.
And among deprivative recognition policies, we can distinguish two
kinds. The first is the traditional policy of deprivative recognition—in which
the state merely recognizes the partners for the purpose of taking away a
benefit but has no interest in the cultural recognition of the partners. The
best examples of such policy are the termination of alimony and welfare. In
the second category, unintended deprivative recognition policies, the state has
some interest in the cultural recognition of the partners, but by recognizing
the partners it creates an economic injustice. Below, I start with defining and
exploring traditional deprivation, then discuss unintended deprivation.
A.

Exploring Traditional Deprivative Recognition

The state regularly allows people to enjoy the economic gain that stems
from the nonrecognition of their relationships (or tries to prevent it only in
rare and extreme cases). Part I provided examples—in the context of SSI and
the marriage penalty—in which the state infrequently tries to recognize
unmarried couples against their will in order to withhold or terminate a benefit that stems from nonrecognition.191 The same is true about post-marital entitlements and benefits—those are terminated upon remarriage, but not upon
cohabitation. Nonetheless, in other particular contexts—social welfare and
alimony—some states have developed more aggressive tools to pierce the veil
of nonrecognition and to eliminate the gains that stem from it. This is traditional
deprivative recognition.
I call this regulatory mechanism deprivative recognition because the
recognition is against the partners’ will and deprives them of essential resources.

191. As another example, an unmarried partner can be considered an “insider” in bankruptcy

proceedings for the purpose of avoiding alleged preference. See In re Levy, 185 B.R. 378
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995). Ironically, unmarried couples who resemble married couples may
not file a joint case, regardless of whether the debtors have incurred joint debts or have
obtained joint assets. See In re Malone, 50 B.R. 2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); In re Clem, 29
B.R. 3 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982); In re Coles, 14 B.R. 5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).

Deprivative Recognition

1315

Deprivative recognition can be initiated by third parties or by the state, but it
is always the state that ultimately pierces the veil of nonrecognition.
Deprivative recognition results in a financial loss to at least one member of
the newly recognized partners.
Importantly, in deprivative recognition, it is not the financial change
(that may result from having a partner) that induces the recognition; rather, it
is a change in family status.192 The state has different ways to calculate funding
from external sources (for example, in the welfare area, income from any external source is calculated as an in-kind contribution or unearned income and
will be dealt with according to the regular rules). But in deprivative recognition it is the partnership that is recognized, rather than merely the financial change
that it may cause.
Traditional deprivative recognition is probably the oldest mechanism for
legal recognition of people in nonmarital unions. While partially ascriptive
recognition was first established in 1977 (that is, ascribing ex-post maritallike obligations on a couple vis-à-vis each other upon the request of one of the
partners), the first statute that created deprivative recognition dates to
1934.193 Significantly, deprivative recognition is markedly different than
common law marriage because, in the latter, the couple is recognized as married for
all purposes—with all the obligations and benefits.194 In deprivative recognition, on the other hand, the partners are recognized ad hoc, for an immediate
purpose only. Below, I examine the two most established and common cases
of traditional deprivative recognition: termination of spousal support and
termination or reduction of social welfare benefits.
1. The Cohabitation-Termination Rule
This Subpart focuses on the cohabitation-termination doctrine: the rule
that spousal support is terminated, modified, or suspended upon a recipient’s
cohabitation, sometimes only with a person of the opposite sex,195 and occasionally even without the need to prove that the new relationship creates economic
192. The termination of the benefit or entitlement, in some cases, as I explain below, could be

rebutted by a show of no financial change, but first and foremost it is family status that
matters.
193. J. Thomas Oldham, Cohabitation by an Alimony Recipient Revisited, 20 J. FAM. L. 615, 621 (1982).
194. Abrams, supra note 20, at 27.
195. Absurdly, if an ex-partner cohabits with a person of the same sex, in some states this
relationship will not bring the termination of the benefits. See Jill Bornstein, At a Cross-Road:
Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Policies and Principles of Equity: The Effect of Same-Sex Cohabitation
on Alimony Payments to an Ex-Spouse, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1027 (2010) (analyzing some
cases that held post-marital cohabitation with same-sex partner will not affect alimony).
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interdependency between the cohabitants or financial change in the lives of
the alimony recipient.
The legal rule of cohabitation-termination originates from the longstanding principle that remarriage of alimony recipients triggers termination
of spousal support, or is a prima facie case for such termination.196 The rationale behind this principle is that alimony is the continuation of the duty of
support imposed by marriage.197 Accordingly, when a new husband marries the
maintenance recipient, he assumes the duty to support her.198 Termination
thus prevents the “double support” that would otherwise be provided by the
two spouses (the “ex” and the current).199
Seemingly, the cohabitation-termination rule applies a similar rationale
to that of terminating alimony upon remarriage. Accordingly, if a spousalsupport recipient is now cohabiting with a new partner, the ex-partner should
not continue to support the recipient. The duty of support should now transfer to
the new partner. Further, the alimony recipient’s financial condition may
have changed and the recipient may no longer be in need of spousal support.200
Moreover, some contend that the policy of terminating alimony only upon
remarriage, but not upon cohabitation, discourages people from remarrying—and marriage is an important state interest.201 Others suggest that it is

196. See Cynthia Lee Starnes, One More Time: Alimony, Intuition, and the Remarriage-Termination

Rule, 81 IND. L.J. 971, 973 (2006).

197. LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 521 (4th

ed. 2010).
198. Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage”: Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15

YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 25–26 (2003).
199. Lois Ullman, Alimony Modification: Cohabitation of Ex-Wife With Another Man, 7 HOFSTRA

L. REV. 471, 480 (1979) (describing court cases that justify the remarriage-termination rule
as preventing double support). A different view is that alimony in the no-fault era is based
upon the woman’s need for support after divorce. Accordingly, if the woman remarries, her
need is assumed to have changed, and, as a result, alimony should be terminated. Starnes,
supra note 196, at 987–91. This rationale does not justify the automatic termination of
alimony because not every marriage changes the woman’s need. See id. at 990 (“Even if a
need-based model could convincingly explain alimony, it cannot explain the remarriagetermination rule.”). Some scholars view alimony as an entailment, a result of the partner’s
contribution to the household and to the family’s financial growth, which entitles the
recipient to an equitable share upon divorce. Additional justification for alimony, which is
designated by one scholar as a “postmodern” approach, views alimony as an entitlement—the
recipient is entitled to compensation for time served and investments made, such as in raising
the children, etc. But if alimony is an entitlement, why should it be terminated upon
remarriage or cohabitation? See, e.g., id. at 991–94 (defining “postmodern alimony rationales”
and claiming that they cannot explain the remarriage-termination rules).
200. See HOMER H. CLARK JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 463 (1968).
201. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 193, at 638.
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immoral to allow the maintenance recipient to spend her ex-spouse’s money
on her new partner.202 Another justification is that cohabitation allows unmarried
partners to enjoy double benefits, while easily hiding their new financial and
personal situation.203
Nevertheless, nonmarital relationships are different from marriage in
ways that call into question the rationales of the termination-cohabitation
rule. First, not all unmarried partners support each other financially during
the relationship, and a duty of support is not a mutual legal obligation in
nonmarital unions, as it is in marriage.204 Second, because nonmarital relationships are not formalized, it is hard to penetrate them and determine
their nature: Are the partners roommates, friends, or intimate? It could be
even more challenging to determine effectively the economic relationships
within them.205
States have taken three different approaches to the issue of spousalsupport recipients who cohabit. Some states have mandated the termination
of alimony upon proof of cohabitation, regardless of the economic implications of the new partnership on the alimony recipients (that is, without proof
that the financial situation of the alimony recipient has improved as a result of
the relationship).206 A second approach has been to use a rebuttable presumption
that cohabitation causes a financial change that justifies termination or modification of alimony.207 Importantly, the establishment of presumption shifts
202. Northrup v. Northrup, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (N.Y. 1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting)

203.

204.
205.

206.

207.

(“Today’s decision leaves the courts powerless to relieve the former husband of the obligation
of subsidizing his former wife’s affairs no matter how unfair this may be under the
circumstances.”).
E.g., Scharwath v. Scharwath, 702 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Miss. 1997) (“The parties who live in
cohabitation can easily and purposely keep their condition of mutual financial support
concealed from the paying spouse, as well as from courts seeking only financial
documentation before it will grant a modification.”).
Perry, supra note 198, at 12–13. Furthermore, even if the cohabiters do support each other,
the level of that support may be different between partners; and it is clear that even if
economic interdependency exists, such is not created immediately, as it is upon marriage.
Furthermore, the assumption that the alimony should be terminated because the recipient
has a new partner who can support her is problematic because, as demography indicates, after
two years most cohabitations either end or have converted into marriage. See Aloni, supra
note 110, at 581. Even more fundamentally, because all states allow for unilateral no-fault
divorce, and some states have repealed their doctrines of necessaries, the idea that an alimony
recipient’s new spouse is going to support her is based on dated notions.
ALA. CODE § 30-2-55 (Supp. 2011) (“Any decree of divorce providing for periodic
payments of alimony shall be modified by the court to provide for the termination of such
alimony upon petition of a party to the decree and proof that the spouse receiving such alimony has
remarried or that such spouse is living openly or cohabiting with a member of the opposite
sex.”); 750 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/510 (West 2013).
CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323(a)(1) (West 2013).
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the burden of proof to the alimony recipient who needs to demonstrate that
there is no financial change that justifies the termination of maintenance.
And still other states have taken a third approach: They demand proof of
change in the recipient’s financial situation due to the cohabitation.208 In
many states, the rule is codified in statute; in some others, it is court-created.
Besides the three approaches noted above, variations exist in what is
considered a cohabiting couple for the purposes of termination or modification of spousal support. For example, New York authorizes termination of
alimony if the recipient “habitually” lives with a person.209 Under this regime,
the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, disapproved
termination of alimony for a woman whose relationship with her partner was
described as “intermittent intimacy with the same male, being more than a ‘brief
encounter’ and perhaps a ‘liaison dangereuse.’”210 In another case, a different
court held that termination was not warranted when a recipient was merely sharing
an apartment with another man in the manner of a housemate, because sexual relations are a required component.211 Other states have been more explicit about
the need for a sexual relationship between the partners. For example, Illinois specifically demands that the relationship be “conjugal.”212
A different approach has been adopted in the Massachusetts Alimony
Reform Act of 2011, which has been characterized as “an about-face that
could reverberate across the country”213 and is the most contemporary model
to deal with alimony termination.214 Among a few interesting issues that the

208. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-86(b) (2009) (“[T]he Superior court may . . . suspend,

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

reduce or terminate the payment of periodic alimony upon a showing that the party receiving
the periodic alimony is living with another person under circumstances which the court finds
should result in the modification, suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because
the living arrangements cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of
that party.”); In re Marriage of Dwyer, 825 P.2d 1018 (Colo. App. 1991) (holding that in
Colorado mere cohabitation was not sufficient to terminate alimony to cohabiting ex-wife,
and stating that cohabitation that diminishes or eliminates the wife’s need for support could
warrant a modification or termination of alimony).
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 248 (McKinney 2010).
Watson v. Watson, 331 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
See Citron v. Citron, 398 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
750 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/510 (West 2013) (“if the party receiving maintenance
cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis”); cf. TEX. FAM.
CODE. ANN. § 8.056 (2006).
See Jess Bidgood, Alimony in Massachusetts Gets Overhaul, With Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2011, at A11.
A similar (but not identical) reform is currently being discussed in Connecticut. See H.R.
5509, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2012).
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regime raises,215 the statute does not specifically mention that sexual conduct
between the cohabitants is required in order to show that the “persons” maintain a
common household.216 Thus, one could ask whether a relationship between
an alimony recipient and her best friend, who live together in a way that produces a “benefit in the life of either or both”217 and creates some emotional
and economic dependency, would be cause for termination or suspension of
alimony. Similarly, the statute could rationally be interpreted as allowing alimony
termination for a recipient who lives with and is supported by her parents.
To clarify, the cohabitation-termination rule is no longer a private matter
arising between divorced persons. Rather, it is a rule enforced by the state, and its
alleged purpose is to prevent or stop cases of unjust enrichment by virtue of
nonformalized unions. As noted, in numerous states the terminationcohabitation rule shifts the burden of proof to the cohabitant to show that the cohabitation does not create economic interdependency; other states order automatic
termination upon showing of mere cohabitation. Moreover, alimony is a
state-created legal obligation that is granted by a court decree. Conceptually,
if a spouse does not support his ex- or current partner, the burden of support

215. The Massachusetts statute is a prime example of the problems associated with attempts to as-

cribe marital-like obligations to non-registered partners. According to the statutes, the
“persons” at stake are deemed to maintain a common household “when they share a primary
residence together with or without others.” MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49(d)(1)
(LexisNexis 2011). This definition raises the question of whether couples who do not share
residency but who might create their financial interdependency should be exempted from alimony termination. In addition, the arbitrary nature of the rule is evident by the requirement
of three months living before termination of alimony is warranted, a time that does not
necessarily bear out the premise that the cohabitation generates economic dependency.
Moreover, the ambiguous statutory language that leaves full discretion to the courts to
determine whether someone is part of a couple encourages litigation and often necessitates
private investigators to dig into private lives in order to prove the nature of the relationships.
216. The statute authorizes the court to suspend, reduce, or terminate alimony if the payer shows
“that the recipient spouse has maintained a common household . . . with another person for a
continuous period of at least 3 months.” MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 208, § 49(d) (LexisNexis
2011). According to the statutory language, “[p]ersons are deemed to maintain a common
household when they share a primary residence together with or without others.” Id. §
49(d)(1). The statute then provides some factors that may be considered by the court to
determine “whether the recipient is maintaining a common household.” The factors the
court can examine are: “(i) oral or written statements or representations made to third parties
regarding the relationship of the persons; (ii) the economic interdependence of the couple or
economic dependence of 1 person on the other; (iii) the persons engaging in conduct and
collaborative roles in furtherance of their life together; (iv) the benefit in the life of either or
both of the persons from their relationship; (v) the community reputation of the persons as a
couple; or (vi) other relevant and material factors.” Id.
217. Id. § 49(d)(1)(iv).
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moves to the state.218 The cohabitation-termination rule is, thus, a regulatory
mechanism to recognize partnerships outside of the partners’ commands.
2. Social Welfare
In the welfare context, deprivative recognition is less prevalent and is
currently used in only a minority of states. In the rest of the states, mere
cohabitation with a partner does not change the definition of the family unit.219 To
clarify, in many states, living with an unrelated adult may change eligibility for
welfare because in-kind assistance is calculated in determining eligibility. But in
states that apply deprivative recognition in the welfare context, additional support
to the family is not the determinant factor; rather, the relevant factor is the
cohabitation—and the impact of considering in-kind assistance is different
than that of including the income of an additional person.
A reasonable explanation for the limited use of deprivative recognition
in this area lies in notorious earlier regulations that are commonly known as
“man in the house” rules or “substitute father” rules.220 These laws aimed to
eliminate access to funds under Aid to Dependent Children (the older welfare
regime)221 by women who cohabited with men. One of the rationales for the
rule222 was that if there was a man in the home he was considered the breadwinner,
and thus his income had to be included in the means test—which resulted in elimination of the recipient’s welfare benefits.223 The enforcement of man-in-thehouse rules was accompanied by unscheduled visits by social workers and even
midnight raids to catch unmarried cohabitants.224 The practice ended in
1968 when the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Alabama’s substitute father
218. Cf. Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L.

219.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

REV. 957, 969 (2000) (“By declaring a woman to be a man’s wife or widow at common law,
courts shielded the public fisc from the potential claims of needy women, effectively
deflecting those claims inward to a particular private, family unit.”).
See Robert A. Moffitt et al., Cohabitation and Marriage Rules in State TANF Programs, at ix
(RAND Labor & Population Working Paper Series, Paper No. WR-585-1, 2009) (“[M]ost
states disregard unrelated cohabitor vendor and cash payments to the TANF recipient and
her children.”).
See generally Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE
L.J. 1347 (1963).
See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 401–406, 49 Stat. 620, 627–29 (establishing Aid to
Dependent Children). In 1962, an amendment to the Act changed the program’s name to “Aid and
Services to Needy Families with Children.” King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311 n.1 (1968).
Another rationale was the alleged immorality of these arrangements, and these rules and their
concomitant enforcement practices targeted mainly African Americans. Kaaryn Gustafson,
The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 649 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 649–50.
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regulation.225 Since then “welfare offices devoted markedly less attention to
the men involved in the lives of women receiving welfare.”226
Yet even today a few states still use deprivative recognition in order to
disqualify unmarried partners from eligibility to Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF), or to reduce the benefit.227 TANF is a federal assistance program that provides support to needy children and their families.228
The states, not the federal government, individually define the “family
unit.”229 Eligibility for the program is limited to families with children.230
Most interesting for this Article’s purpose is the way that states treat households
with cohabiting unmarried partners when one of the partners is not the child’s
legal parent.
Unsurprisingly, California, always a “leader in . . . punitive approaches to
welfare reform,”231 still has a policy that recognizes cohabitation for purposes
of reducing the welfare amount.232 According to the unrelated-adult-male
rule, the state imposes a duty on an unrelated adult male to make a minimum
financial contribution to the family equal to the amount that it would cost
him to provide living expenses for himself (amazingly, “unrelated female
adults” are exempted and are not required to make any contribution).233 This
sum is reduced from the welfare grant and could result in a significant decrease
in benefits.234 The regulations are limited to conjugal partners only. While
there is no specific mention of sexual activity, the regulations exclude “roomer

225. See King 392 U.S. at 333–34.
226. Gustafson, supra note 222, at 651.
227. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

104–193, §§ 401–02, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113–15 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–02
(2006)).
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (reauthorized and revised by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006)).
See Primus & Beeson, supra note 55, at 196.
See id. at 196–97.
Gustafson, supra note 222, at 644, 659 (describing California as “one of the most aggressive
states . . . in investigating and prosecuting welfare fraud cases”).
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, § 11351.5 (West 2001); Russell v. Carleson, 111 Cal. Rptr.
497 (Ct. App. 1973) (affirming the constitutionality of the law).
CalWORKs Handbook: Unrelated Adult Male, COUNTRY OF SANTA CLARA §§ 20.1.2, 20.4
(Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.sccgov.org/ssa/afdc/afchap20.pdf.
See Moffitt et al., supra note 219, at 10. Similarly, in calculating eligibility for General
Assistance (support to the very poor who do not qualify for other public assistance),
California reduces aid to recipients who share housing with relatives or nonrelatives who have
no duty to support them. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, § 17000.5 (West 2011); PUBLIC
BENEFITS HANDBOOK: GENERAL ASSISTANCE, GENERAL RELIEF, BENCHMARK INST.
3/5, available at http://benchmarkinstitute.org/our_training/_PBChapter3.pdf.
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and boarder” from responsibility.235 To be exempt, the unrelated adult male
“must have separate sleeping facilities which could be considered a rental
unit.” The regulation provides specific examples of such a unit, including “a
separate bedroom or porch.” The regulation warns, however, that “the couch
in the living room is not considered a rental unit.”236 Nonintimate partners
who share residency (for example, housemates) need to provide an affidavit
with appropriate evidence in order to be exempted (such as a rent receipt or
evidence that they share different rooms).237
Only two other states use such an aggressive method of deprivative
recognition. In Oklahoma, unrelated partners’ incomes are deemed fully part
of the household income, thus very likely to reduce TANF eligibility.238
Likewise, in 2011, Kansas revised its regulation so that income of a “cohabiting
boyfriend or girlfriend” will be considered in determining TANF eligibility
and benefits.239 The purpose of the policy is to “treat cohabiting couples similar to married couples.” Friends are specifically exempted but need to file a
statement to be excused.240 Three other states (Minnesota, North Dakota,
and Wyoming) automatically reduce a recipient’s grant when she lives in
the same residence with another adult. And one state, South Dakota, reduces a recipient’s grant when another adult living in the home pays any amount toward
shelter costs (it seems that this regulation could, in fact, be applied to
nonintimate partners).241
It is hard to predict if deprivative recognition in this arena will get more
pervasive. A study found that from 1993 to 2006 five states modified their
policies to target unmarried partners, while two others (Oregon and Virginia)
have changed their laws in the opposite direction (not to recognize these couples in regard to responsibilities).242

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See CalWORKs Handbook: Unrelated Adult Male, supra note 235, § 20.1.5.
Id.
Id. § 20.2.
Moffitt et al., supra note 219, at 10–12. Interestingly, to encourage marriage with someone
who is not the father’s child, Oklahoma deems only half of the income of the stepfather
relevant to eligibility. Id. at 11–12.
Memorandum from Kathe Decker to Econ. & Emp’t Support Program Adm’rs 5 (Oct. 25, 2011),
available at http://content.dcf.ks.gov/ees/keesm/implem_memo/11-1-11%20implementation%20
memo.pdf.
See id. at 5–6.
Moffitt et al., supra note 219, at 7.
Id. at 23–24. (In Moffitt’s table, only four states changed their policy to employ what this
Article calls deprivative recognition. But since the publication of Moffitt’s study, Kansas has
also changed its policy).
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3. Traditional Deprivative Recognition as a Regulatory Mechanism
Is traditional deprivative recognition a necessary response to the changes
in family structure and to the risk that people use their nonmarital status to
gain financially, or is it an unfair mechanism that strips people of vital financial
resources?
One sensible perspective is that the policy of deprivative recognition only
unveils the real function of the family and it is therefore a justified policy. It is
an appealing apparatus because it responds to the proliferation of nonmarital
partners who enjoy more benefits than their household justifies.243 Such a
mechanism allows the state to divert resources to families who truly need
them, or who need them more. Amy Wax, for example, explains that the
previous welfare policies, which allowed unmarried partners to benefit from
their nonmarital status, were “viewed as unfair and corrosive of public morals.”244
Policy that benefits nonmarital unions, moreover, encourages people not to
get married—in order to get bigger grants—thus standing in contradiction to
the welfare metastrategy of promoting marriage.245 Others could consider
deprivative recognition as a progressive course, as it departs from brightline
rules of marriage versus nonmarriage and employs a functional test to uncover
the relationship between the partners and their eligibility for the benefit,
based on the purpose of the law.246
Looking more broadly at the context in which traditional deprivative
recognition has been, and is, operating reveals why it is not normatively justified. I suggest that deprivative recognition is more than a functional test to
examine the genuine structure of the family vis-à-vis the benefit at stake. Rather,
deprivative recognition is a selective regulatory mechanism policing only behaviors that are deemed immoral. Further, deprivative recognition generally
produces inequity because it most often results in economic maldistribution
of resources between the partners and between the state and the partners. Finally,

243. Analogously, when an alimony recipient does not get married only to avoid the termination

of alimony, deprivative recognition is an effective remedy responding to the recipient’s
strategic behavior and reflects the real family unit.
244. Amy L. Wax, Norm Change or Judicial Decree? The Courts, the Public, and Welfare Reform, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 52 (2009).
245. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of
Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 415, 460–81 (2005) (documenting how
one of the main purposes of TANF has been to promote marriage and traditional family
values and structure).
246. Cf. POLIKOFF, supra note 48, at 126 (“A legal system in a pluralistic society that values all
families should meld as closely as possible the purposes of a law with the relationships that
that law covers. Marriage is not the right dividing line.” (emphasis omitted)).
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deprivative recognition may halt the creation of new kinships. I provide four
grounds for the assertion that deprivative recognition is an unjust policy.
First, the state uses deprivative recognition in areas that traditionally
have been deemed to have moral implications.247 Deprivative recognition, at
least as it currently operates, is restricted mainly to eliminating alimony and
welfare and thus reflects the long-held tradition that “transfer payments to assist
needy children and their caregivers are considered pathological (‘welfare as we
know it’), while transfer payments for widowed and disabled persons stay
respectable, a kind of insurance.”248 Thus, benefits to widows and widowers
are only terminated if they remarry, but not if they cohabit. Conversely, alimony termination “punishes women for engaging in activity deemed immoral
by legislators.”249 The moral nature of deprivative recognition can be best
seen by the fact that some states—ironically, those that employ the harshest
method of deprivative recognition—exclude same-sex couples from alimony
termination.250
The selective nature of deprivative recognition is clearer when one realizes that it stands in contradiction to the trend toward privatization of support
in family law. Brenda Cossman observes that in the United States there are
three (sometimes conflicting) influential conservative values: fiscal conservatism, libertarianism, and social conservatism. Cossman demonstrates that in
family law the tendency is generally to shift the cost of support from the state
to the private sphere—to the partners (fiscal conservatism).251 But “[t]he privatization of support obligations has occurred only to the extent that it can be
made consistent with the social conservative vision of the family.”252 The social
conservative vision of family is one that favors marriage over other relationships.

247. Another theory that could explain why the state terminates benefits that stem from non-

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

recognition in selective cases is the greater political power possessed by the constituencies
that enjoy the benefit. For example, it is probable that the law maintains cohabiting couples’
survivor benefits while terminating or reducing their TANF because the elderly—
beneficiaries of survivor’s benefits—enjoy greater electoral power than poor women who
receive TANF benefits. The two theories—that deprivative recognition is selective based on
morality or based on political power—can coexist, because even if one accepts that the
different treatment is related to political power, then the policy is still unjust (because the
groups that can protect their interests through the political process are treated more
favorably).
Bernstein, supra note 27, at 182.
Ullman, supra note 199, at 480; see also HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 463 (1968) (discussing the termination or reduction
of alimony due to cohabitation under the rubric of “misconduct” of the wife).
See Bornstein, supra note 195, at 1035–36.
Cossman, supra note 245, at 420–21.
Id. at 421.
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Supporting this view of conflicting social and fiscal conservatism is the case of
spousal-support termination.253 By terminating alimony (without imposing
any automatic obligations on the new partnerships), the state diminishes the
scope of private responsibility and even takes a risk that the previous recipients of alimony will now rely on welfare.254
A second justification for the argument that deprivative recognition is a
selective legal mechanism is that it stands in striking incongruity to the way
states are reluctant to ascribe marriage-like rules when they are actively sought
by one of the partners. The justifications that states proffer for not extending legal
protections to unmarried couples contradict the justifications for employing
deprivative recognition.
California, a state that exercises an aggressive deprivative recognition
policy in cases of both alimony and welfare, is a paradigmatic example of contradictory policies. In the two doctrines, the presence of a man in a woman’s
apartment raises a rebuttable presumption about financial interdependency.
Ironically, while presuming economic interdependency based merely on
common residency, California denies the extension of such a presumption
when an unmarried couple seeks benefits or protections (both for recognizing
obligations between the partners and for affording the benefits that spouses
enjoy with respect to third parties). For instance, unmarried cohabitants in
California have no standing to sue for loss of consortium based on injury to or
the death of their partner;255 cannot claim a cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress based on witnessing injury to their partner;256 cannot
sue for the wrongful death of their partner;257 and are not eligible to claim
unemployment compensation benefits if they quit work to accompany their

253. Deprivative recognition in the welfare area works somewhat similarly: Terminating welfare

254.

255.
256.
257.

could ostensibly lead to the privatization of support (the man, not the state, will support the
welfare recipient). But that is true only assuming that the result of the reduction or
elimination of the grant will lead to that, rather than to the separation (or at least the
noncohabitation) of the couple. The policy is more consistent with the social conservative
view because the policy is “familialing and gendering.” Fiscal conservatives are more focused
on transforming the mother into a productive worker, and so could choose a different
strategy. See id. at 480–81.
Indeed, according to the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, a court would not enforce—or
would only partially enforce—a waiver of alimony in a prenuptial agreement if it would result
in the recipient’s eligibility for public assistance. A similar provision that prohibits the
termination of alimony in such case—or court decisions that deny termination of alimony
because the recipient would be eligible for public assistance—do not exist, as far as I know.
Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588–90 (Cal. 1988).
Id. at 588.
Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 184 Cal. Rptr. 390, 393 (Ct. App. 1982).
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partner (but would be eligible if they were married).258 While cohabitants can
sue each other to enforce expressed or implied agreements for alimony or
property distribution, the cohabitation does not shift the burden of proof to
the cohabitant who denies the obligations, and the contract must be provable
in any case; in other words, here, a presumption of economic interdependence
does not exist.259
Courts often rationalize their decision not to extend rights to unmarried
couples by reference to evidentiary problems.260 Accordingly, when the state
does not presume an economic duty between unmarried partners in terms of
benefits and mutual obligations, it is responding to evidentiary and bureaucratic
problems in recognizing these couples. Indeed, exploring and proving the
economic and emotional nature of such partners involves some difficulties.261
Moreover, courts are allowed to use presumptions in different way when it
concerns different issues. But this problem has not stopped the state from
raising a presumption of economic interdependency when it seeks to eliminate benefits. Common residency is sufficient to raise such presumption for
the purpose of ending or reducing social welfare and alimony. Thus, there
should be no difference in presuming economic interdependency for the purposes
of wrongful death, employment compensation, and alimony upon separation.262 Presumptions reduce litigation costs for the parties and further judicial
economy.263 Therefore, I do not argue that courts cannot raise presumption
of independency in case of terminating a benefit from unmarried partners,
258. Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 904 (Cal. 1983).
259. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121–22 (Cal. 1976); Schafer v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.

Rptr. 513, 517 (Ct. App. 1986) (ruling that the Marvin remedy is based on contract law).

260. See, e.g., Norman, 663 P.2d at 910 (“Recognizing and favoring those with established marital

and familial ties not only furthers the state’s interest in promoting such relationships but
assures a more readily verifiable method of proof.”).
261. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 41, at 311 (“Marital intent is subjective; when not publicly
expressed, it is extraordinarily hard to prove.”).
262. In this regard, one could argue that the state can justify recognizing a couple for one purpose
and not for a different purpose. Accordingly, it is well established that different
administrative agencies can examine different factors in different cases. For example, the
state’s concerns in granting tax benefits are different from those it has regarding wrongfuldeath standing. But the state cannot raise a presumption based on the same fact
(cohabitation) and then deny the presumption in another, similar case. In the same way that
issue preclusion “prevents the relitigation of an ‘issue’ decided in an earlier proceeding based
on a different cause of action,” the state cannot argue that the same factor immediately
presumes economic interdependency—or even immediately terminates alimony—but
selectively contradicts it right afterward. Antonio Gidi, Issue Preclusion Effect of Class
Certification Orders, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1026 (2012); see also Fara Agrusa, Court of
Appeals Applies the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to an Administrative Determination, 63 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 154 (1988) (discussing issue preclusion by administrative agencies).
263. Antonio E. Bernardo et al., A Theory of Legal Presumptions, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2000).
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while refusing to raise such presumption when unmarried partners seek benefits.
What I argue is that the different treatment is illuminating why the evidential
inquiry that accompanies request for recognition for benefits by unmarried
couples cannot be justified alone as a reason to reject their requests. Moreover,
deprivative recognition involves termination or withholding of benefit that
either court (in divorce proceedings) or the state (in welfare) has already
granted to the party. Termination of this benefit, thus, requires more caution
than a decision to grant it.
The state can also rely on marriage promotion grounds to justify treating
recognition for the purpose of eliminating benefits differently from the way it
treats recognition for the purpose of granting benefits. Surely, employing
deprivative recognition, while not recognizing unmarried couples in claims
for recognition that will benefit the partners, is congruent with marriage
promotion policy.264 By denying such recognition, a state incentivizes couples
to get married: If a couple wants to enjoy a panoply of rights, the price is marriage.
And if a couple enjoys benefits from nonrecognition, eliminating those benefits likewise encourages people to get married.
But even if the two policies are reconcilable, this does not make them legitimate. Deprivative recognition does not promote marriage—marriage too will
result in the elimination of the benefit (for example, the income of the spouse
will be calculated for welfare purposes; alimony will be terminated). Thus, it
is doubtful that deprivative recognition encourages marriage, rather than only
preventing cohabitation in certain populations. And forcing people to marry
when they are not ready or do not want to do so is not a tenable policy.265 If
the purpose of the policy is to cause people not to cohabit (in order to avoid
benefit termination) then it is also questionable whether it is a wise policy.
Because most marriages today are preceded by cohabitation, and because having
another supporting person at home could be (but is not always) financially
and emotionally advantageous, it may be in the state’s interest to let these

264. For the purpose of this article, I assume that marriage promotion is a permissible and even

desirable state action. See generally Kaaryn Gustafson, Breaking Vows: Marriage Promotion,
the New Patriarchy, and the Retreat from Egalitarianism, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 269, 286–90,
301–08 (2009) (discussing the purposes of marriage promotion programs and criticizing the
premise that marriage is the best status for families, arguing that marriage promotion policies
both capture and further an anti-egalitarian sentiment, but do not implicate protected privacy
interests).
265. Cf. Garrison, supra note 41, at 304 (“[M]arriage can be harmful as well as helpful . . . and
some obvious marriage promotion strategies—for example, marriage incentives that produce
more ‘shotgun’ marriages—could easily increase the number of weak marriages and thus work
more harm than good.”).
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partners stay together. Finally, it is doubtful that a policy is valid whose purpose is to discourage partners to cohabit for moral reasons alone.
To clarify, I do not argue that a state has to provide the same protections
and benefits to married and unmarried partners.266 But withholding benefits
from unrecognized partners and at the same time denying them protections
that stem from the very same relationships is tantamount to penalizing these
partners based on a particular moral viewpoint.267 The consequence of recognizing cohabiting couples in order to eliminate benefits and simultaneously
not recognizing them commonly (preventing access to other benefits) is not
simply that they are not provided an advantage, but it is much more burdensome in
that these couples are penalized for not being married.268 Further, such a policy is
most harmful to partnerships in which there are power differences between the
partners, particularly if the wealthier party does not want to make a financial
commitment. In such cases, terminating the benefit but not obligating the
refusing party to take financial responsibility does not promote marriage—it
promotes economic injustice.
The third justification for the proposal that deprivative recognition produces inequity is that it can lead to economic maldistribution. By calculating
the income of both partners together in order to terminate a benefit, the state
assumes—without reason—that the couple is economically interdependent,
although cohabitation does not warrant any duties of support between the
couples.269 Indeed, “the mere fact of living together provides little evidence of

266. See REGAN, supra note 119, at 127 (justifying distinctions in treatments of unmarried couples

for the purpose of the state’s and third parties’ benefits, based on a marriage promotion
justification).
267. Cf. Garrison, supra note 41, at 296 (“Because cohabitation typically does not produce the
same income-pooling benefits as marriage, a policy based on the assumption of incomepooling by cohabitants is counterfactual and might produce serious inequity . . . .”).
268. In addition, a marriage promotion policy can encourage marriage in society in some ways,
like providing couples with counseling, but such an invasion into people’s autonomy in
choosing relationships exceeds the legitimate authority of the state to promote marriage. See
Gustafson, supra note 264, at 303 (“State Healthy Marriage programs may encourage, or even
require, welfare recipients to attend pro-marriage counseling but do not require them to
marry. Some of the initiatives provide welfare recipients who marry more money than they
currently receive, but do not propose giving unmarried recipients any less than they currently
receive.”).
269. There are various studies, with somewhat different results, about the percentage of couples
who share their incomes. There are also variations in the patterns of pooling income between
subgroups of cohabitants. See BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 138–41. To generalize, about 50
percent of cohabitants do pool their incomes to some extent. See id. These numbers are
limited to cohabitating opposite-sex couples. They do not say anything about nonintimate
partners who share households, not to mention partners who do not live together.
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what their relationship means.”270 Thus, the result of deprivative recognition
could be stripping people of an important financial resource without providing a new one and without considering whether there has been an economic
change in their situation.
Fourth, deprivative recognition is an undesirable policy because it constructs
a palpable barrier to the creation of new kinships and relationships. That is,
partners must consider carefully before they move in together because the financial
consequences—or, at least, the invasive inquiry that will most likely occur—will be
harmful. Moreover, this hurdle to the creation of new living arrangements targets
precisely the groups that need less-traditional living arrangements for support.
Those who live with relatives, friends, and caregivers in the same apartment are
overwhelmingly the elderly, the disabled, and people from low-income
populations.271 It is true that deprivative recognition generally exempts
nonintimate partnerships. But deprivative recognition policies impose a bureaucracy to investigate the nature of the relationships, which is already a burden
(one reason is because it could require people to define their relationships
when they are not ready to do so). In the welfare context, for example,
having an unrelated adult in one’s apartment almost immediately invites
questions from social workers and could easily deter people from living together.272

270. Garrison, supra note 41, at 312.
271. See, e.g., Jong Won Min, Cultural Competency: A Key to Effective Future Social Work With

Racially and Ethnically Diverse Elders, 86 FAM. SOC’Y 347, 351 (2005) (describing how
family and support networks are especially important to elderly people of color).
272. We can infer deprivative recognition’s harm to the creation of new supportive networks from
the following story. Tadeusz M. Sypek and Maria S. Sypek had a separation agreement that
included a cohabitation-termination provision: “Support payments shall terminate upon the
Wife's remarriage or if the Wife takes up residency with another man to whom she is not
married.” In this case the parties themselves—rather than the state—contracted about this
term. But the way that the provision was enforced was the same as with the statutory
cohabitation-termination rule. Thus, in this case, the husband sued the wife to terminate
alimony payments after the ex-wife moved into the apartment of a ninety-seven year old
blind person who “cannot ambulate without a walker, and . . . has a pacemaker, a hearing aid,
a truss for his rupture, and a leg brace.” The ex-wife’s job was as his housekeeper and
caregiver. The ex-husband claimed that the separation agreement said that termination of
alimony would take place upon her residing with another man, regardless of the type of
relationship. The court, quite angry about the injustice and absurdity of the claim, rejected
the husband’s suit and obliged him to pay attorney’s fees. But this case shows the harm to the
creation of networks of support: When someone needs to fear a termination of alimony when
moving for work, this is a real hurdle to the development of new living arrangements. This is
of course an extreme case and one that was initiated from an act of private ordering, but there
is no reason to believe that cohabitation-termination rules would not function the same way.
See Sypek v. Sypek, 497 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851–53 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
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Unintended Deprivative Recognition

Unintended deprivative recognition is another subcategory of purely
ascriptive recognition. Currently, the only case—that I know of—that falls
under this category is the new financial aid rule. While the results of unintended deprivative recognition are similar to those of traditional deprivative
recognition (that is, the partners are deprived of a vital benefit that stems
from their relationships, while being denied other benefits that stem from
recognition), here the state actually has some interest in the cultural recognition of the relationships.
The new rule for calculating federal financial aid eligibility for dependent
students with unmarried cohabiting parents is different from traditional
deprivative recognition and may be the harbinger of a new type of deprivative
recognition—one that does not stem from animus against less traditional
families.273 It is unique for a few reasons. First, unlike the previously discussed
examples of deprivative recognition, the financial aid rule is imposed by the
federal government (as opposed to the states). Second, it responded to a demand
for cultural recognition of a historically marginalized group. Third, the rule
could be justified, as argued by Nancy Polikoff, as applying to parents rather
than to partners—a progressive policy that shifts the focus from marital status
to children’s needs.274 Accordingly, the parents should share the burden of
raising the children (after they reach college age), and their marital status has
nothing to do with the amount of financial aid that their children receive.
Despite good intentions behind the rule and the progressive justification
for it, the new federal financial aid rule also leads to deprivation, because under the
current American legal system, parenthood and coupling are not entirely separate.
Significant financial benefits accrue to married parents that are unavailable to
unmarried parents merely because of their marital status. The deprivative nature of
273. It is possible to categorize the financial aid rule differently: decoupling parentage from adult

relationships (recognizing parenthood without ascribing partnership rights on the parents).
Under this category, parents are recognized solely for their duties as parents, but if they are
partners their relationships go unrecognized. The question of recognizing parenthood
without recognizing partnership is complex, and exceeds the scope of this paper. For the
purpose of this paper and for the category of unintended deprivative recognition, suffice it to
say that, as recognized by several courts during the litigation of same-sex marriage,
segregating parenthood from partnership is not easy; and when the partnership is
unrecognized, this has direct financial consequences on the parents. See, e.g., Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921, 973 (2011).
274. Nancy Polikoff, Financial Aid Changes for Children of Same-Sex (and Other Unmarried)
Couples, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE (Apr. 30, 2013, 11:15 AM)
http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/2013/04/financial-aid-changes-forchildren-of.html.
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unintended deprivative recognition stems from its asymmetrical nature: It
recognizes the partners only for purposes of withholding a benefit, and bestows some cultural recognition on some parents who were disregarded by the
law previously. But the recognition still results in financial determinant to the
parents.
C.

The Regulatory Effect of Deprivative Recognition

Analyzing deprivative recognition uncovers another layer of existing
regulation that affects the lives of those in unrecognized relationships. While
some scholars, such as Lieb275 and Rosenbury,276 astutely acknowledge that some
regulations already direct and influence the lives of the unrecognized, this
Article exposes a layer of regulations that thus far has not been explored.
Regulation of nonmarital unions is more complex than generally assumed and
sends a complicated (but well-understood) message: Deprivative recognition
signals that some people should get married—otherwise, they will be penalized (by
withholding some support but not adding new sources of support). Alternatively, partners who need support (from the state or from their ex) should not
live together. At the same time—despite the fact that no state mandates obligations of support between unmarried partners—by withdrawing other sources
of support from the new partner, this regulation both assumes and communicates
that unmarried intimate partners are expected to support each other financially.
By focusing on alimony—an order that is provided primarily to women—
deprivative recognition also sustains traditional gender roles, assuming that
men do and should support women. Nonintimate partners, conversely, are
exempt from such requirements, thus reinforcing the idea that nonintimate
unions are still inferior to others and cannot serve as primary relationships. In
such ways, deprivative regulation polices people’s interpersonal behaviors.
The influence of deprivative recognition and its prevalence could increase
the more that the number of nonmarital unions grows. Further, it is unclear
whether nonintimate relationships will remain immune from deprivative
recognition. Recall that the most progressive alimony law (Massachusetts’)
has already moved—at least theoretically—toward interdependency, rather

275. LEIB, supra note 157, at 78–79 (arguing that the law is already present in the life of friends

and providing examples from criminal and corporate law in which friendship is given special
consideration).
276. Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 202–07 (contending that, by ignoring friendship, the law
regulates people’s preferences in terms of organizing their relationships around marital
relationships while devaluing others).
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than sexual activity, as the main factor determining recognition of partnerships
that warrant termination of alimony. And, concerning the legal recognition
of nonintimate partners, if such partners were to enjoy similar benefits as other
partners, what reason is there to distinguish them from intimate partners—
including for the purpose of imposing duties?
Indeed, recognizing friends exemplifies one of the tensions that exist between
the aspiration of recognizing the plurality of relationships and the adverse
effect that such recognition can have. Taking a simple approach for the moment,
the state is faced with two options—both result in undesirable consequences.
One, the state could simply ignore friendship, as it currently does. But as has
been argued in Part II, complete nonrecognition of friendship relationships
results in both cultural and economic harm. Further, if a couple of friends
create a relationship that is financially and emotionally interdependent, why
should it have a different consequence on the receipt of alimony or welfare benefits
than intimate relationships have? Alternatively, the state can legally recognize
relationships between friends who live together for a certain time for purposes of
rights, protections, and duties. Such legal recognition, however, can result in
cultural misrecognition because not all friendships are the same, and many do
not create economic interdependency. Such recognition can also result in
economic injustice if the friends are not economically interdependent.
Recognition of nonmarital unions thus raises the question whether it is
possible to legally recognize more types of relationships without causing financial
detriment and cultural harm; and if the answer is yes, then the question becomes,
how can this be done? Assuming, for the moment, that the state has an interest in
legally recognizing partners in nonmartial unions (for duties and for protections),
such recognition has to follow some sort of ascription. But ascription, as we have
already seen, raises questions of economic injustice and cultural recognition. Put
differently, is there a way to settle the tension between cultural recognition
(recognizing more types of relationships) and distributive justice in the law governing unmarried partnerships?
The tension between cultural recognition and distributive justice is not
unique to family law. It is an inherent tension that stands at the center of the
debate in other scholarly disciplines. Understanding this tension helps one to
better understand both the tensions between proposals for more recognition
of relationships and the possible resultant financial detriment, and the way to
resolve this tension. The next Part returns to the scholarship discussed in
Part II and examines how to integrate the double-edged sword of recognition
into proposals for legal change.
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RECOGNITION AND REDISTRIBUTION IN FAMILY LAW

The previous Part has shown how ascription can lead to economic injustice.
Responding to this finding, in this Part, I take one step back from deprivative
recognition to examine more broadly the connection between cultural recognition
and economic redistribution in the law of unmarried partners. My goal is
to offer a theoretical tool that will settle the tensions between cultural
recognition and economic justice in family law. In other words, I investigate how family law can fulfill its dual fundamental goals—redistributive
justice and cultural recognition of relationships—such that neither goal
negates the other.
To accomplish this, I look at the question from a theoretical angle. I
first examine what cultural recognition means as a philosophical and political
value. I identify the rise of cultural-dignitary recognition with the appearance
of multiculturalism and briefly present the main and most recent theories of
recognition. I then introduce Nancy Fraser’s critique of recognition as an inadequate social justice claim that does not meet the demands of distributive justice and her alternate analytical perspective of recognition and redistribution.
Using Fraser’s work as a point of departure, I turn back to the law of unmarried
partners. Extrapolating on Fraser’s work, in Part IV.B, I explore how Fraser’s
dual paradigm should guide family law in the search for policy that accommodates the needs of nonmarital partners.
A.

Recognition Versus Redistribution

Cultural recognition, as a social justice claim, has gained prominence in
social movements and politics since the 1960s.277 Such claims have been typical
and central to struggles over sexual, gender, and racial equality.278 The debate
over what exactly “recognition” means is the subject of much discussion.279
For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that the struggle for
recognition is characterized by a political group that demands cultural ac-

277. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE

POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 37–38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994); SIMON THOMPSON,
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF RECOGNITION: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 2 (2006)
(suggesting that recognition as a political claim emerged from the collapse of democratic
consensus during the late 1960s and was replaced by political movements that embraced
multicultural notions).
278. See FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 33, at 1; Taylor, supra note 277, at 36–37.
279. See, e.g., Paddy McQueen, Social and Political Recognition, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/recog_sp (last updated Apr. 8, 2011).
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knowledgment for some feature it possesses, a collective identity.280 That is,
the demand for equality is not conditioned on assimilation to the norms of
the dominant majority.281
The origin of recognition as a normative philosophical backbone is old,
reaching back to Hegel’s well-known dialectic on the master-slave and the
notion of “the struggle for recognition.”282 Responsible for its resurgence to
the academic front in the late twentieth century are primarily the theoreticians Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth. In a nutshell, Taylor asserts that
recognition “is a vital human need” because people’s identities are shaped,
formed, and determined by the way other people recognize them.283 Because
recognition is such a necessity, misrecognition “can inflict a grievous wound,
saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred.”284 This respect for identity
should be applied to the public sphere as well. Taylor also differentiates between
politics of equal recognition and politics of differences. The former is founded
on formal equality and universalism: All subjects are treated similarly. The
latter accommodates peoples’ and groups’ uniqueness and differences while
not forcing assimilation to the dominant culture. A politics of cultural recognition supports the politics of differences. Similarly, Honneth conceptualizes all
social and political conflicts as expressions of the struggle for recognition.285
The intervention of the American critical theorist Nancy Fraser is in
pointing out the inadequacy of recognition as a sole normative claim. Her
central argument is that the rise of the politics of recognition has eclipsed the

280. See THOMPSON, supra note 277, at 3.
281. See FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 33, at 7.
282. See generally G. W. F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 230–70 (A.V. Miller trans.,

1977). In this subchapter, Hegel tells the story of two consciousnesses that try to achieve
independence in the world. But one consciousness understands that it cannot reach approval
and independence without the recognition of the other consciousness. The problem is that
the existence of the other consciousness, which also looks for independence, threatens the
independence of the first consciousness and it starts “a life-and-death struggle.” In the
struggle, the two self-consciousnesses confront one another. The struggle ends in the
creation of an asymmetrical relationship between a master—who won because he was ready
to sacrifice his life—and a slave—who was ready to give up in order not to lose his life.
Ostensibly, the master becomes superior but he does not enjoy the recognition he receives
from the slave, who is his inferior. The slave, on the other hand, succeeds in developing a
better sense of self-consciousness and creates a world through his work. This change
gradually leads them to reconceptualize their relationship in a way that each recognizes the
other. See id.
283. Taylor, supra note 277, at 25–26 (describing “identity” as “a person’s understanding of who
they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being.”).
284. Id. at 26.
285. AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL
CONFLICTS 137–40 (1995).
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previously dominant politics of redistribution: a social struggle that was focused
on injustices that stem from socioeconomics and whose remedy was the fair
distribution of resources.286 Currently, the widely acknowledged injustice is
misrecognition and, in accordance, the remedy has become recognition—a
development that has risked neglecting the struggle for distributive justice.
She also contends that social justice endeavors are presented as focusing on
pursuing either recognition or redistribution—as offering distinct and opposite
views on social justice.287 On the surface, according to Fraser, recognition and
redistribution are incommensurable because they treat group differences in a
contradictory fashion. Redistribution is founded on locating classes as a result of an
unjust political economy and seeking to abolish group differences. Conversely,
cultural recognition struggles can either advocate for the celebration of differences or for the deconstruction of differences.288 When recognition strives to
celebrate differences and redistribution aims to abolish differences, there are
tensions between the proposed remedies. But, according to Fraser, the contradictory nature of these claims is a “false antithesis.”289
In fact, recognition and redistribution, as “folk paradigms of justice,” are
not mutually exclusive alternatives.290 Fraser contends that “[v]irtually all realworld axes of subordination can be treated as two-dimensional,” meaning that
they all “implicate both maldistribution and misrecognition.”291 For example,
gender can be interpreted as a classlike differentiation because it structures
the division between paid productive labor and unpaid domestic work. The
remedy in accordance is redistributive redress: the abolition of gender as a
class. At the same time, “gender appears as a status differentiation, rooted in
the status order of society.”292 This status subordination—expressed by sexual
harassment, domestic violence, unequal representation, and more—is a result
of devaluing femininity and is a part of the harm of cultural misrecognition.
While these two harms—cultural and economic—can intersect, they are
not byproducts of the other; rather, each has some independence. Addressing
only one of them will not solve the problem.293 But the two remedies are not

286. See Fraser, supra note 32, at 68, 70–74 (1995) (“[G]roup identity supplants class interest as

the chief medium of political mobilization.”).
FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 33, at 12–15.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
See id. at 11.
Id. at 25.
Nancy Fraser, Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition: A Two-Dimensional Approach to
Gender Justice, 1 STUD. SOC. JUST. 23, 26 (2007).
293. See id.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
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easily pursued simultaneously. Abolishing economic injustice means abolishing
the gendered division of labor. If one views gender merely as a redistributive
problem, then the remedy is abolition of gender as class.294 The remedy for
cultural injustice is recognition—overcoming sexism and misogyny by revaluing the status and practices of women. The problem with these two remedies
is that they could run counter to each other: Redistribution seeks to abolish
gender differences while recognition seeks to elevate these differences.295
In order for the dual claims to coincide, Fraser suggests adopting transformative remedies rather than affirmative remedies.296 Affirmative strategies are
“remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements
without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them.”297 Transformative remedies “mean remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework.”298 For example,
consider the politics of identity as applied to gay rights, a strategy that aims to
present homosexuality as an essentialist identity in order to end discriminatory
policies (affirmative remedy), rather than confronting and deconstructing the
societal distinction of gay versus nongay (transformative remedy).299 In the
distributional aspect, examples of an affirmative remedy include the welfare
state: programs that help to recover maldistribution but do not change the
underlying structural problems that cause economic injustice.300 Transformative strategies in distributive justice are those that reduce social inequality
without creating stigmatized groups of recipients.301 Fraser contends that the
combination of transformative recognition with transformative redistribution
results in the most plausible plan because it is the only combination that
would not end in perpetuating one or the other injustice.

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See Fraser, supra note 32, at 76.
Fraser provides similar accounts of contradictory remedies in the sexual and racial arenas. See id.
Id. at 89–91.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Identity politics is the use and emphasis of a group’s unique character in order to achieve
political goals. It promotes an essentialist view of the group. There is ample critique on the
use of identity politics, most recently in the gay rights movement. The main critique is that
such politics can perpetuate a monolithic or inflexible view of the group. See, e.g., Richard T.
Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 55 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
300. Fraser, supra note 32, at 84.
301. Id. at 85 (“Transformative remedies typically combine universalist social-welfare programmes,
steeply progressive taxation, macro-economic policies aimed at creating full employment, a
large non-market public sector, significant public and/or collective ownership, and
democratic decision-making about basic socioeconomic priorities.”).

Deprivative Recognition

1337

Tensions similar to those identified by Fraser exist in the law of unmarried partners. Below, I explain this dilemma in more detail—by applying it to
specific proposals and theories—and suggest how to resolve it.
B.

Beyond Recognition

Scholarly proposals aimed at repairing the legal situation of unmarried
partners face a similar set of tensions as those analyzed by Fraser: recognition
of people in nonregistered unions requires ascription; ascription often leads to
contradiction between cultural recognition and economic justice. Multiple
scholarly proposals exemplify this tension; the purpose of this Subpart is first
to deconstruct these disagreements. Section II.A showed how some family
law scholarship identifies the combination of economic and cultural injustices
as the harm of marriage exceptionalism. But Parts II and III also raise questions
about the ability of major proposals in family law to encompass both perspectives without reducing one to the other. One central problem with these proposals
is that, recognition remedies are decoupled from redistribution remedies, and
eventually eclipse the latter. This Part examines these tensions in a theoretical and
systematic fashion. At the same time, it helps to reconcile the squabble, suggesting
a way to rethink regulation in the field in a way that economic justice and cultural
justice are compatible.
1. Deconstructing Proposals for Recognition
The following table catalogues major proposals according to their suggested remedies, allowing us to elucidate the tensions between them and the
tensions in policies concerning unmarried partners in general. Ultimately, it
also shows which proposals will result in maldistribution or misrecognition,
and which will cross this hurdle and achieve both.
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TABLE 1.

Redistribution302

Recognition

Affirmative
Ascribing obligations between partners regardless
of their clear consent;
could result in misrecognition (and maldistribution
for those who benefit from
nonrecognition) (ALI,
Bowman)
Recognition of nonmarital
unions; cultural respect
toward marginalized relationships; supports relationship differentiation
(Leib, Lifshitz)

Transformative
Duties and rights are distributed
based on family function; supports care-work and vertical relationships rather than horizontal
relationships and marriage
(Polikoff, Fineman)

Recognition based on the value
of the relationships rather than
status; reconstructions of relationships; blurs relationship differences (Rosenbury, Franke)

In the first cell, where redistribution and affirmation intersect, we find
the proposals whose remedies aim primarily to solve economic
maldistribution. These proposals suggest status-based legal recognition of
marriage—like unions to prevent unfair economic distribution. They are less
concerned about cultural misrecognition.303 The redistributive nature of these
proposals—versus their secondary treatment of dignitary recognition—
becomes clearer because such remedies can result in misrecognition if they assign
recognition status to people who are not interested in it. The proposals also
risk blurring group differentiations since most cohabitants are treated the
same. At the same time, the proposals aim to apply only to intimate partners,
thus still maintaining cultural misrecognition of nonintimate partnerships. In
addition, despite their redistributive intention, the proposals can result in
economic detriment for those who enjoy financial gain from nonrecognition.
Both proposals are affirmative because they suggest only an ad hoc solution

302. “Redistribution” here is broadly defined and includes wealth transfers between the partners

and division of resources by the state.
303. Unjustified economic loss can also be a dignitary loss; and the economic loss stems from the

devaluation of nonmarital unions. But the response and the problem are mainly about unfair
financial loss to nonmarital relationships and the devaluation of domestic work. Bowman,
supra note 59, at 9 (providing examples of typical harm that is incurred by unmarried
cohabitants, all of them related to financial loss).
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rather than targeting the source of the problem: the focus on status rather
than on the function of the family.
In the second cell, where redistribution and transformation intersect, is
the project of “valuing all families,” as described by Polikoff.304 This is not a
clear-cut categorization for this work, because Polikoff cares deeply about the
cultural and symbolic harm that stems from marriage exceptionalism and
suggests a few remedies to fix it.305 But looking at her model overall and its
principles clarifies that her remedies are mainly distributive in nature, in the
sense that they tend to focus on ways in which resources are allocated (and
stem from her respect for care-work and human need) rather than on the cultural value that is attached to specific types of families.306 In fact, Polikoff’s
proposal tends to blur group differentiation in that it moves away from status
(such as marriage and registration) as the prerequisite for fair assistance and
protection.307 Likewise, Fineman suggests distributive transformative reform.
Rather than subsidizing and supporting adult relationships, the state needs to
distribute resources to support “derivative dependents”—those who provide
support to those who cannot care for themselves—rather than supporting
adult relationships.308 Her theory thus is transformative because it shifts the
view from adult relationships to support of care and radically transforms the
conditions that merit allocation of resources. Both proposals emphasize vertical
relationships and de facto give more force to care-work—and thus tend to
disfavor recognition of types of adult relationships that are not based predominantly on care-work.
In the third cell, where recognition and affirmation intersect, are proposals
that support cultural recognition of more types of relationships, and ask to
distinguish these groups from others. Those who promote such recognition,
on the one hand, would encourage the law to bestow greater protections on
nonmarital partners. On the other hand, they insist on distinguishing between
types of nonmarital unions by ascribing different sets of rules to each group.
In other words, affirmative recognition advocates more group differentiation.
304. POLIKOFF, supra note 48, at 123–45.
305. For example, Polikoff suggests that marriage as a legal institution will be changed to “civil

partnership,” because “‘[m]arriage’ has a long history of exclusion.” Id. at 132.
306. For instance, the “three key principles for valuing all families”—“place the needs of children,”

“support the needs of children,” and “recognize adult interdependency”—are all concerned
about distribution of resources, either between the state and the caregivers or between the
adults. Id. at 137–43.
307. Further, as indicated by Rosenbury, Polikoff’s proposal privileges dependent care and
interdependence “by implying that domestic caregiving should be the essential element of the
states’ definitions of family.” Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 200.
308. FINEMAN, supra note 165, at 161–65.
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For example, while Leib’s remedies are somewhat distributive in their nature
(recognizing friendships for specific financial purposes, holding fiduciary duties),309
he does not want friends to be treated similarly to intimate partners.310 Thus,
for instance, he does not support the creation of a registry for friendships. He
wants the law to recognize the cultural value of friendships, but only as far as
they remain a distinct group from other types of relationships. Leib’s proposal is
affirmative in its nature. While he acknowledges the structural problems
associated with marriage exceptionalism, his remedy is limited to providing
some rights and protections to friends because ending the overall problems of relationship regulation is unrealistic.311 Likewise, Lifshitz advances the “case against
equalizing the mutual obligations of cohabitants and married partners.”312 Under
his proposal, cohabitants would be divided into a few types, who would be treated
differently. His cultural recognition ratifies strict differentiation between
types of relationships and is restricted to intimate partnerships.313
In the fourth cell, where recognition and transformation intersect, are
the projects that extend value into more types of relationships while deconstructing hierarchies of relationships. Rosenbury’s claim is mainly critical of
the symbolic harm that stems from misrecognition of friendships and the way
that the legal division between intimate and nonintimate relationships perpetuates gender inequality.314 Unlike Leib, who is occupied with affirmative
recognition, Rosenbury’s main enterprise lies in deconstructing the privileges
attached to in-home (domestic) relationships.315 In a similar fashion, Franke
309. Eric Posner, who reviews Leib’s book, also concludes that “[i]t quickly becomes clear that

310.
311.
312.
313.

314.
315.

when Leib says friendship should be subject to ‘regulation,’ he does not mean anything as
radical as that term conjures up.” Eric A. Posner, Huck and Jim and Law, NEW REPUBLIC
(Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/friend-transformation-ethan-leib
(reviewing ETHAN J.LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP—
AND WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT (2011)).
Cf. LEIB, supra note 157, at 82–83.
Id. at 72–73.
Lifshitz, supra note 16, at 1569.
See Id. at 1586 (“Yet, even those who believe that, in certain instances, cohabitation
relationships reflect such implied or relational contracts cannot ignore the fact that, in other
cases, refraining from marriage indeed reflects a conscious rejection of marriage and its legal
consequences or that, in yet other cases, cohabitation serves as a kind of trial period prior to
marriage.”).
Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 191 (“This Article illustrates how family law’s failure to
recognize friendship impedes existing attempts to achieve gender equality through the
elimination of state-supported gender role expectations.”).
As stated before, Rosenbury’s practical proposal is purposefully general (a guideline). In
some interpretations, her remedy is considered affirmative recognition. Her normative
commitment, however, is clearly transformative. Id. at 226 (“Although potentially useful as
an interim strategy, changing the legal content of either family or friendship will likely not do
enough to alter the incentives that push women to prioritize domestic relationships over
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critiques arguments in favor of recognizing friendships as status, because such
a stand “indulges the misplaced view that, if something important is at stake,
law should regulate it.”316 At the same time, she encourages the creation of
more thoughtful menus of options that would recognize different types of
relationships.317
Classifying these proposals exposes the problem that is inherent in ascription of status upon unregistered parents: when trying to solve one of the
axes of the harm (either cultural harm or economic injustice) the proposals inflict
the other injustice on the partners. This classification thus illustrates the tension
between cultural recognition and distributive justice in the law of unmarried
partners. But Fraser’s framework not only exposes the weaknesses of the
proposals but also helps in formulating theoretical tools for how to recognize the
plurality of relationship types while avoiding financial injustice.
2. Reconstructing the Differences
In order to find the way to achieve the goals of cultural and distributive
justice for nonmarital partners, we need to see which combination of recognition
and distribution would reduce the problems of nonrecognition and
maldistribution. From Fraser we know already that transformative remedies
can work together—but we need to see how to apply it in family law.
One grouping that does not work together is affirmative redistribution
(Bowman, ALI) with transformative recognition (Rosenbury, Franke). The
project of assigning status and “expanding the shadow of marriage” is at odds
with the project of deconstructing marriage and the hierarchy of sexual and
nonsexual relationships.318 Acknowledging the variety and complexity of relationships as proffered by transformative recognition is antithetical to protecting
only marital-like relationships, as advanced by affirmative redistribution.
Another pair that is at odds is affirmative redistribution (Bowman, ALI)
with affirmative recognition (Leib, Lifshitz). Affirmative redistribution remedies
aim to reduce differences between some types of relationships (married and
other relationships. Instead, such approaches risk reinforcing the line between friends and
family, thereby strengthening the existing hierarchies of care instead of challenging them. In
order to alleviate these risks, family law scholars must move beyond the construction of the
family in order to examine the construction of family law as a whole.”).
316. Franke, supra note 123, at 2703.
317. Katherine Franke, Civil Unions in Hawaii and Illinois: How’d They Get it Right?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katherine-franke/civilunions-in-hawaii-an_b_827132.html.
318. See Franke, supra note 123, at 2697 (“The intended effect of the ALI Principles is to enlarge
marriage law’s shadow.”).
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cohabitants) by creating statuses that bring more people under the scope of the law
and treat them similarly to married couples. Affirmative recognition, on the
other hand, fosters further group differentiation. Affirmative recognition
and affirmative redistribution are counteractive because affirmative redistribution provokes misrecognition of differences between relationship types,
while affirmative recognition asks to formalize the differences in types of
relationships.
A more plausible combination is affirmative redistribution (Bowman,
ALI) with transformative redistribution (Polikoff, Fineman). Indeed, in her
book, Polikoff endorses the ALI recommendations.319 But these two remedies can be at odds, too. This is because affirmative redistribution is primarily
about finding a way to create a better division of resources, but is limited to
marriage-like relationships in which the couples share the same residence.
Conversely, transformative redistribution is dedicated to changing the deep
structure of the economics of relationships and to transforming the distribution of resources from status-based to need-based. That is, transformative
redistribution aspires to move away from marital rules toward a vindication of
caregiving and dependent caregiving, regardless of the status of the family.
Transformative redistribution (Polikoff, Fineman) paired with transformative
recognition (Rosenbury, Franke) is the combination that can most readily address
both economic maldistribution and cultural recognition of diverse types of
relationships without increasing disparity in those areas. Transformative
redistribution would verify that rights and privileges from the state, and obligations between partners, are being distributed based on interdependency and
the function of the family, rather than on status of the family. Transformative
recognition would balance the focus on care-work, vulnerability, and interdependency (factors advanced by transformative redistribution as worthy of
protection) with recognition of multiple and diverse relationships, including
those that do not provide care in the traditional sense. That means that transformative recognition would promote cultural recognition of more relationships (such
as relationships that are not based on domestic care), which would halt the
development and entrenchment of “hierarchy of care.”320
The combination of both remedies can ensure—against the backdrop of
more legal recognition—that there is recognition of nonrecognition. In other
words, both approaches could protect the interest of those partners who do
not wish to be legally recognized by the state. Protecting couples from

319. POLIKOFF, supra note 48, at 177–79.
320. Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 228.
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deprivative recognition is consistent with both camps because transformative
redistribution is (presumably) committed to imposing duties based on function, rather than based on status.321 Transformative recognition, on its side,
will insist on creating safe libertarian-like space in which people’s relationships can
still develop and be undefined (that is, the state would not ascribe), as part of
recognition.322
Finally, it is possible that there will be some tension between the two approaches around the existence of registration schemes and their role in family
law (for example, what are the consequences of being registered or not). This
is because transformative redistribution distances itself from status and registration;
but it appears that transformative recognition, in its quest for recognition of
diverse relationships, would support the creation of multiple registrations that
will assist people to organize their lives. It seems that both camps could agree on
the existence of a registry if the following conditions are satisfied: First, there is a
variety of state institutions that culturally recognize the differences between relationships but do not perpetuate the hierarchy between the relationships.323
Second, registration is not the only way to gain the full scope of protection
by the state, but, rather, the function of the family is considered as well. In
other words, registration scheme is consistent with economic redistribution
because registration provides a useful and accessible mean for couples to organize
the legal consequences that stem from their relationship. Registration saves the
need for lawyers, multiple documents, and engaging with bureaucracies.324
This Article does not propose a unified, detailed plan for transformative
recognition and redistribution. Its aim is only to point out that addressing
321. While the Article does not aim to provide a policy for treating unmarried partners, these

theoretical tools are helpful in crafting policy regarding unmarried partners. For instance,
redistribution and recognition can provide a framework for solving the issues that arise when
nonregistered partners enjoy financial benefits due to their status. Accordingly, purely
ascriptive recognition might be a suitable policy in these instances, and might not. It could
be a suitable policy in a world where benefits, rights, and protections are allocated by
functional tests. In such a scenario, purely ascriptive recognition could bring about the
cultural recognition of all relationships without perpetuating the notion of fixed, idealized
relationships, and would respond to the financial reality between partners. Purely ascriptive
recognition would not be suitable, as it is unsuitable (and, indeed, deprivative) now, in a
world where it creates both dignitary harm (generating stigma) and economic
maldistribution.
322. Cf. Franke, supra note 123, at 2697 (“marriage as currently defined and governed by law . . . .
also seeks to govern—and indeed does govern—the lives of those who lie outside the pickets
of marriage itself.”); Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy,
59 EMORY L.J. 809, 863 (2010).
323. See Aloni, supra note 111, at 578 (suggesting a registration scheme open to a variety of
nonmarital unions could be different than marriage, rather than inferior to it).
324. Id. at 618.
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only distributive injustice or only cultural harm will always yield inequitable
results.
The proposals advocated by the transformative plans are not without
problems. Transformative remedies are harder to pursue than affirmative
remedies because, by their nature, the former are more revolutionary. And
there is always the valid question of what to do until transformative change
arrives; some rightly argue that perhaps it is better to seek incremental (affirmative) change that protects some people than to work for structural
change that may never come. These well-known and valid questions are at
the center of the debate regarding social and legal change, and there are many
approaches to the dilemma.325 This Article does not offer an answer to this
dilemma. Rather, the Article crafts a general vision that could be useful even
in considering small changes in the law; that is, revisions to specific laws—not
only big revolutions—should follow the offered paradigm.326
CONCLUSION
Over the past two decades, while the marriage equality movement has
gained significant traction, scholars criticized the movement for its over-focus
on marriage. One of the concerns that were voiced was that extending marriage’s symbolism increases marriage’s shadow into all other relationships
(that is, nonmartial unions are being evaluated and treated comparably to
marriage).327 By that, the marriage equality movement entrenches the symbolic power of marriage and the decreasing choices of marriage alternatives.
This critique has often been dismissed as too vague and unrealistic.328 The
harm that was proffered by marriage critics seemed too far in the future, too
academic. But the harm is present and clear. Not only do we know already
that in many places, as soon as same-sex marriage was legalized, civil unions
were abolished. But as this Article tells, the choice to live in nonmarital, undefined
unions, is also diminishing. The harm that can be caused by over-recognition
is already tangible.
325. See, e.g., MICHAEL T. HAYNES, THE LIMITS OF POLICY CHANGE: INCREMENTALISM,

WORLDVIEW, AND THE RULE OF LAW 3–5 (2001) (arguing that incrementalism is the
most realistic and preferred plan for legal and social change).
326. For instance, to implement transformative policies, not only full reorganization of the whole
system would work. Rather, specific laws that rely on the function of the family for specific
purposes—constitute important steps.
327. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 236, 246–47 (2006).
328. See, e.g., Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and
the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567, 604–08 (1995).
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LGBT organizations that applaud the financial aid rule somewhat
blindly pursued their aims of cultural recognition without considering the
economic distributional effects of their lobbying—especially the effect it has
on other unmarried partners. But it is not only unmarried opposite-sex couples
who will be harmed by this new rule: In the same week this new policy unfolded
concerning student financial aid, a study found that the overall poverty rate
has increased within the LGBT community and that same-sex couples are
more likely to be poor than opposite-sex couples.329
The lesson from the financial aid saga should be learned by legal scholars
who, with good intentions, seek more recognition of unmarried partners.
Lawmakers, advocates, and scholars should consider the bottom line at the
same time that they consider issues of recognition; they should choose their
battles carefully and in a way that helps to mitigate rather than exacerbate systemic problems. Cultural and legal recognition are important, of course, but
family law must ensure that the pursuit of these goals does not create or support
policies that discriminate against unmarried partners.
Similarly, functional family law is a good and important cause. But ascription is a double edged-sword; purely ascriptive recognition may be seen as a
progressive policy that addresses the partners’ function as a family rather than
their documented status; and that may be an accurate description. But ascription can also become deprivative. Progressive individuals should also be careful not to mistake the agenda of valuing all families with that of over
regulation of relationships.
Thus, everyone’s goal should be equitable distribution of resources and
benefits for all families, regardless of their status. Promoting this platform is
the best means of winning true, deeply rooted equality for unmarried partners.

329. See M.V. LEE BADGETT, LAURA E. DURSO & ALYSSA SCHNEEBAUM, NEW PATTERNS

POVERTY IN THE LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL COMMUNITY (2013), available at
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGB-Poverty-Update-Jun-2013.pdf.
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